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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON COLLEGE INVESTMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Yaacov Wittman
Dirk Krueger
This dissertation consists of two chapters studying the importance of household income for
shaping student outcomes in the market for higher education in the United States. The first
chapter uses the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 to document that conditional on
student ability, high-income students are more likely to enroll in college and are more likely
to attend a highly selective college conditional on enrolling. These gaps are mostly explained
by differences in application rates and in enrollment rates conditional on being admitted,
rather than differences in admission rates. While students generally prefer to attend the
most selective college they are accepted to, low-income students are less likely to attend
their preferred college due to costs. These findings suggest that financial aid provided by
colleges is generally insufficient in closing enrollment gaps, and that the observed application
gaps may be rational: low-income students will choose not to apply if doing so is costly and
they do not expect to receive sufficient aid if admitted.
Motivated by the empirical findings of the first chapter, the second chapter builds and estimates an equilibrium model of the U.S. college market featuring tuition discrimination and a
decentralized admissions system. Students who differ in their financial resources and innate
ability apply to a subset of colleges and are uncertain about their prospective admissions
and financial aid. Colleges observe a noisy signal of student ability and compete by choosing
admissions standards and tuition schedules. According to the estimated model, differences
in application rates between high- and low-income students, conditional on ability, are due
to student expectations over admissions and financial aid, which are consistent with college policies in equilibrium. Low-income students receive generous financial aid at selective

v

colleges because only the highest-ability among them apply, making their signals highly
informative. If signals became less informative (e.g., colleges stopped using the SAT), all
high-ability students would be worse off and only high-income, low-ability students would
modestly benefit. Finally, the model suggests that increasing federal need-based financial
aid greatly benefits low-income, high-ability students by alleviating credit constraints.
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CHAPTER 1 : Income Gaps in College Attendance
and the Role of the Admissions System
1.1. Introduction
Large gaps in college outcomes between high- and low-income students in the United States
have been well documented in recent decades. Bailey and Dynarski (2011), for example,
show that among children born in the 1980s, 54% from the top income quartile completed
a bachelor’s degree and only 9% of children from the bottom quartile completed one. These
gaps are even more pronounced when considering college quality: Chetty et al. (2020) find
that in the most selective U.S. colleges, about 65% of enrolled students are from the top
income quintile while only 4% are from the bottom quintile.
While much of these gaps can be explained by differences in test scores which are known
to be correlated with parental income, studies have found that gaps remain even when
controlling for student ability.1 As a result, there is concern over a potential mis-match
between students and colleges, where students who would benefit from college do not attend,
or students who do attend end up enrolling in colleges that are either too high or too low in
quality relative to the students’ ability. Recent evidence has found that mis-match between
students and colleges occurs because of student choices at the application stage. Dillon
and Smith (2017) for example, uncover substantial mis-match using independent measures
of student ability and college quality, and find that it is largely driven by application and
enrollment choices. Similarly, Hoxby and Avery (2013) find that low-income, high-achieving
students are significantly less likely to apply to highly selective colleges despite the generous
financial aid typically offered.
1

See, for example, Belley and Lochner (2007) and Chetty et al. (2020).

1

Do gaps in college outcomes between students of different socio-economic status continue
to be a salient feature of higher education in the U.S.? If colleges typically offer financial
aid to qualified low-income students, why do they choose not to apply in the first place?
In this chapter, I answer these questions using a recent data-set called the High School
Longitudinal Study (HSLS), which tracks a representative cohort of high-school freshman
starting in 2009 as they transition to college in 2013. Using the data I find that gaps in
student application and enrollment choices persist, with low-income students less likely to
attend college and less likely to enroll at highly selective colleges if they decide to attend.
Consistent with the previous literature, these gaps are largely due to student choices at
the application stage rather than the admissions stage. However, I find that enrollment
conditional on being admitted is also an important source of the income gaps in college
attendance, especially for middle-income students.
While prior studies have focused on the role of information in explaining why lowincome students do not apply, this chapter considers the hypothesis that even if they were
fully informed, low-income students would still choose to apply at lower rates because
they correctly do not expect to receive sufficient financial aid.2 I provide evidence for this
hypothesis by using the HSLS to examine the enrollment choices of admitted students. I find
that even if admitted, low-income students are less likely to enroll in college and more likely
to report that they are unable to enroll in their preferred college because of costs. These
findings suggest that simply closing application gaps is not sufficient for closing enrollment
gaps, since financial aid is generally unpredictable and may not be high enough to allow
students of all socio-economic backgrounds to enroll in their college of choice at similar
rates. The findings also provide evidence for the hypothesis that it may be rational for
low-income students not to apply in the first place: if applications are costly, applying will
2
The distinction between both explanations has implications for policy. If financial aid at colleges were
sufficient and students lacked information, policies should aim to inform them of their options or provide
application subsidies. On the other hand, if aid were insufficient, then application subsidies would only
increase the number of students who are admitted but choose not to enroll, and may have the negative
effect of adding more noise to the admissions system. In this case, policies that increase college subsidies for
low-income students may be necessary to close the application and enrollment gaps.

2

not be worthwhile if students recognize that they are unlikely to receive enough financial
aid even if they are admitted.
The analysis in this chapter relies on student-level data from the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS). This data-set contains rich information on student demographics,
and is used to identify socio-economic status through direct interviews with parents who
are asked to provide their total family income. Student ability is measured using official
GPAs and SAT scores, which are provided directly from the students’ high-schools and
colleges. The HSLS is well suited to study the role of the admissions system because students were interviewed about their experience with each stage of the college admissions
process. Students were asked to list not only the specific college they chose to attend, but
also to list two other colleges they applied to and were seriously considering. Additionally,
students were asked whether they were admitted to these other two schools, and to list
the college they most preferred among those admitted to if not for costs. The answers to
these questions are then used to separately study how each step of the college enrollment
process —application, admissions, and enrollment (conditional on admission) —contribute
to the observed attendance gaps in income. Finally, I am able to assess the strength of each
student’s application portfolio and enrollment choice by merging the list of colleges they
applied to with data on college quality.3
First, I document that for the recent sample of students in the HSLS, income gaps in
college outcomes persist.4 For example, among students with SAT scores in the top quartile
of the sample, I find that 86% of those in the top sixth of the parental income distribution
enroll in college while only 72% of students from the bottom third do. Among students
with SAT scores in the top tenth of the sample (“high-achieving” students), I find that 60%
from the top sixth of the income distribution enroll at highly-selective colleges,5 while 50%
of students from the bottom third do and only 35% from the middle third do. Exploiting
3

To measure college quality, I follow the literature in using Barron’s Ranking of American Colleges (2015).
Note that the students in the HSLS graduated high-school in 2013, making this sample one of the most
recent sources of data on the topic of college applications and enrollment.
5
Colleges that are considered “most-” or “highly-competitive” by Barron’s.
4

3

the fact that each stage of the enrollment process is separated in the data, I decompose
these attendance gaps into three components due to income differences in: (1) applications,
(2) admissions, and (3) enrollment conditional on being admitted. I find that applications
and conditional enrollment have an equal part in explaining the college attendance gaps in
income, while admissions play a small role. Among high-achieving students, applications
explain the whole gap in attendance at highly-selective colleges for students who are lowincome, but conditional enrollment and applications play an equal role in explaining the
gap for middle-income students.
Motivated by the importance of enrollment conditional on admissions in explaining the
attendance gaps, I study the characteristics of admitted students. I find that among those
admitted, low-income students were more likely to state in the survey that they did not
choose to attend their most preferred college to due to costs. These students generally
preferred colleges with higher median SAT scores, suggesting that financial constraints were
stopping them from enrolling in higher quality colleges. For students who were admitted
to highly-selective colleges, I find the same pattern: the higher-income students were more
likely to actually enroll in such colleges, and less likely to state that they were not attending
their preferred college due to costs. Overall, these results show that while college admissions
are often need-blind, financial aid that is realized after a student is admitted can have a
large effect on his or her enrollment decision. Moreover, these results help explain why lowincome are less likely to apply: if applications are costly, low-income students may decide
that a marginal application is not worthwhile if they do not expect to receive sufficient
financial aid once admitted.
Finally, I study a range of factors potentially correlated with a student’s decision to
apply or enroll in any college or a highly-selective college in particular. I consider many
covariates including measures of student ability, parental income, and other demographics.
I also include high-school level variables including an indicator for whether the student’s
high-school was private, and the fraction in their high-school receiving subsidized lunches. I

4

find that after controlling for all covariates, parental income remains an important factor in
predicting application decisions both at the extensive and intensive margins. It also predicts
enrollment decisions conditional on admission, with low-income students more likely to
state that they were unable to attend their preferred college due to costs. The results thus
highlight the importance of a student’s financial situation in explaining their participation
in the college market.
Related Literature. This chapter contributes to the large literature on inequality in
college outcomes. Bailey and Dynarski (2011) for example document large gaps in attendance and completion between high- and low-income students born in the 1980s. Using
NLSY data, Belley and Lochner (2007) compare high-school students from the early 1980s
and early 2000s to show that parental income has become a stronger predictor of college attendance conditional on family background and ability. Chetty et al. (2020) use tax records
to show that students from the top income quintile are over-represented at highly-selective
colleges, and a counterfactual allocation that only uses SAT scores would increase the share
of low- and middle-income students at these schools. This chapter contributes to the literature by introducing the High School Longitudinal Study to document gaps in college
enrollment at both the extensive margin of whether a student enrolls, and the intensive
margin of college quality conditional on enrollment. The HSLS has the advantage of focusing directly on students’ transitions from high-school to college, and therefore includes rich
information about their experiences with the admissions process.
The importance of application decisions in driving the observed gaps in college outcomes
has been highlighted by Hoxby and Avery (2013) and Dillon and Smith (2017). Using the
universe of SAT takers in 2008, Hoxby and Avery (2013) find that among students who score
in the top 10%, those in the bottom quartile of the income distribution are substantially
less likely to apply to any highly selective colleges despite the generous financial typically
offered. Related papers on mis-match due to application choices include Pallais (2015) and
Black et al. (2015). More recently, Delaney and Devereux (2020) have shown that students

5

of low socio-economic status in Ireland (where the admissions process is centralized and
there is little variation in college costs), are less likely to apply. Finally, there has also been
research documenting the extent of mis-match between student ability and college quality,
including papers such as Light and Strayer (2000), Bowen et al. (2009), Smith et al. (2013),
and Campbell et al. (2019).
Outline. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes in detail the studentand college-level data used, Section 1.3 documents how student enrollment and application
choices vary by parental income and ability. Section 1.4 uses data from student surveys
in the HSLS to examine how students decide to enroll conditional on being admitted to
college, and Section 1.5 studies the factors that statistically predict college application and
enrollment choices. Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2. Data
This chapter’s analysis of high-school student application and enrollment decisions relies
on both student- and college-level data. For student-level data, I use the restricted-use
version of the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS) which allows me to identify
the specific college each student decided to enroll in, and other colleges they had applied to
and were seriously considering. Knowing these specific colleges then allows me to merge the
HSLS with two sources of college-level data: Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (2015)
to measure college selectivity, and The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) for detailed college-level variables including admissions rates, SAT score ranges,
tuition, and financial aid. Each data source I use is described in this section in greater
detail.

1.2.1. Student-level data
The student-level data come from the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS). The
HSLS is published by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and consists
of a nationally representative sample of about 23,000 ninth graders from 944 high schools

6

who are followed throughout their secondary and postsecondary education. The students
and their parents were first interviewed in the fall of 2009 when the students began their
first year of high-school, and then again in the spring 2012 when they completed their third
year. The students were then interviewed once more in the spring of 2013 when most had
graduated from high-school, and again in a follow-up survey in 2016. The dataset includes
rich information about student test scores, college application and enrollment decisions, and
details on student demographics. The restricted-use version of HSLS used in this chapter
also provides SAT and ACT scores, lists of colleges applied to and enrolled in, and more
detailed information about household economic variables.
The goal of this chapter is to study how a student’s college application and enrollment
decision varies based on their parental income and ability. Parental income is provided
directly by the parents who were asked about their household’s income from all sources
both in 2008 and in 2011 (corresponding to the 2009 and 2012 surveys respectively). In the
surveys, the parents were first asked to provide their pre-tax income (from work, investments, and alimony) in dollar amounts. If they skipped this question, they were asked to
provide their income categorically by picking among different income ranges (e.g. ‘$15,000
or less’,‘$15,001 to $35,000’, ‘$35,001 to $55,000’, . . . , ‘$215,001 to $235,000’, ‘More than
$235,000’). Note that for the 2012 follow-up survey, interviews were conducted with only
a sub-sample of parents accounting for slightly less than 50% of students in the overall
sample, meaning that household income in 2011 is statistically imputed for most students.6
Student ability is measured using both high-school GPA for all academic courses, and
SAT or ACT score.7 Each student’s GPA is reported directly by their high-school, and is
honors-weighted in a procedure by the NCES used to make the GPA comparable across
different high-schools. The SAT is reported directly by the students’ colleges, and is there6

The analysis in this chapter uses parental income in 2011 (rather than 2008) since it is was reported
in the spring of 2012 right before students entered their senior year of high-school and started applying to
college.
7
In the data, the ACT score is converted into an equivalent SAT score for students who only took the
ACT. Henceforth, whenever the SAT is mentioned it refers to either the SAT or ACT equivalent score.
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fore unavailable for students who did not attend college or did not take the test. For these
students, the SAT is simply imputed using the mean SAT score of other HSLS students
from the same parental income group, level of parental education, race, and GPA decile.
The HSLS also includes detailed information about each student’s application choices,
which are used to categorize the students’ application portfolios. In the 2013 survey conducted after completing high-school, students were asked to provide the college they chose
to attend and to list two other colleges they applied to and were seriously considering. One
limitation of the HSLS then is that it only includes the three most relevant applications for
students who applied to more than three colleges. However, students were also asked to
provide the total number of applications they sent. Most students indicated that they had
applied to three or fewer schools in total, suggesting that the HSLS gives a good picture
of overall application portfolios. Finally, students were asked whether they were admitted,
rejected, or wait-listed at the other two colleges they applied to (clearly they were admitted
to the one they choose to attend).
Importantly, students were also asked about their preferences over the colleges they
applied to at both stages of the admissions process. For the application stage, students
were asked to list the college that was their first choice (if not for tuition costs) among all
the colleges they listed in their application portfolio. The answer to this question helps
determine how ambitious students are in their preferences. For example, students may
choose the most selective college in their portfolio as their first choice even if it is the most
expensive. For the enrollment stage, students were also asked to list their first choice (if not
for tuition costs) among the colleges that they were admitted to. This question is important,
as it allows one to study the role of college costs in shaping enrollment decisions once all
possible uncertainty about tuition and financial aid is resolved, and students must select
among the choices available to them.
Sample Statistics. The sample is restricted to all students with an observable SAT
score (including imputed scores), and students for whom there is an observable application
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or enrollment choice (and excluding those attending foreign institutions). After accounting
for non-responses,8 the final sample amounts to approximately 15,000 students. Descriptive
statistics on demographics, college preparedness, and application choices of the sample are
provided in Table 17.

1.2.2. College-level data
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges. A measure of college selectivity is needed in
order to understand the composition and strength of each student’s application portfolio.
For simplicity, I follow Chetty et al. (2020) and other empirical studies by using Barron’s
selectivity index (provided in Barron’s Profile of American Colleges, 2015) to categorize
colleges into two groups. The first group, which I call “Highly-selective”, corresponds to
Barron’s Tier 1 and Tier 2 colleges and universities (Barron’s calls these “most competitive”
and “highly competitive”). In total this group makes up 192 schools, all of which are listed
in Appendix A.1.1. The second group consists of all other four-year non-profit colleges and
universities, and is referred to as the “Non-selective” group. In the HSLS sample, I find that
the Highly-selective colleges account for about 16% of all four-year, non-profit enrollment
(representing about 7% of students in the overall sample).9
The selectivity measure from Barron’s ranking is used to categorize the strength of each
student’s application portfolio. Recall that in addition to the college each student chose
to attend, students were also asked to list two other colleges they had applied to and were
seriously considering. If there are no four-year, non-profit applications among the three (or
fewer) colleges the students applied to, the student is considered as not having applied. If
at least one four-year, non-profit application is observed but none of the three colleges are
Highly-selective, the student is considered as only having applied to Non-selective colleges.
8

Throughout the rest of the chapter, the analysis always relies on re-sampling weights to deal with student
non-response.
9
Note that Highly-selective colleges have significantly higher median SAT scores, instructional spending
per student, and endowment assets per student. See Table 1 for a comparison. Only two groups are used
rather than a continuous measure of quality (as in Dillon and Smith 2017) or a larger number of discrete
groups because it simplifies the analysis and helps motivate the model presented in Chapter 2, which considers
only two types of colleges for tractability.
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If at least one Highly-selective and one Non-selective application are observed, the student
is considered to have applied to both. Finally, if students are observed to have only Highlyselective applications, they are counted as having applied to both only if the number of
total applications is greater than the number of listed applications (that is, such students
are assumed to also have applied to a Non-selective school as a safety but did not include
it among their listed applications).
IPEDS. The application-level data from the HSLS sample are merged with college-level
data obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). IPEDS
is a public college-level database managed by the NCES, and is established from a series
of mandatory surveys for all U.S. colleges who participate in federal student financial-aid
programs. IPEDS therefore contains the universe of all four-year, non-profit colleges and
universities relevant for the analysis. The college-level data from IPEDS include variables
relevant for students making their application decisions: expected tuition (net of financial
aid), SAT interquartile range, acceptance rate, and instructional spending per-student. In
acquiring the IPEDS data sample, I focus on the 2013-2014 academic year, which is when
most students in the HSLS would begin their first year of college.
Summary statistics for all four-year, non-profit colleges in the IPEDS sample are provided
in Table 1, where colleges are split into the Highly-selective and Non-selective groups defined
above. The table shows that Highly-selective colleges on average have significantly higher
SAT scores, tuition, and per-student spending. Note that for low-income students, net
tuition (tuition minus all grants) is typically lower at the Highly-selective colleges, though
room and board charges are generally higher. Importantly, the table also shows that the
Highly-selective colleges account for about 16% of all undergraduate enrollment, which is
consistent with the enrollment pattern observed in the HSLS. This provides support that
the HSLS sample is indeed representative of all high-schoolers transitioning to college in
the 2013-2014 academic year.

10

Table 1: Summary statistics for IPEDS sample
College characteristics

Highly-selective

Non-selective

Percent public

55%

73%

Median SAT

1292

1051

Acceptance rate

44%

68%

Tuition and fees

$24,622

$12,598

Room and Board

$11,474

$9,372

Income <30k

-1.85

0.64

Income 30k-48k

-0.02

1.89

Income 48k-75k

4.22

4.85

Income 75k-110k

9.28

7.43

Income >110k

15.92

8.63

Instructional spending per student

$20,746

$8,597

Endowment assets per student

$131,440

$13,271

186

1,577

15.7%

84.3%

Attendance Costs

Net tuition ($1,000s)

Financial variables

Number of colleges
Fraction of undergraduate enrollment

Note: all values are weighted by total undergraduate enrollment at each college. All data are from
the 2013-2014 academic year, except the acceptance rate which was calculated by averaging over
both 2012 and 2013. This sample of consists of all four-year, non-profit Bachelor’s degree granting
colleges available from IPEDS (excluding religious colleges).

11

1.3. College Application and Enrollment in the High School
Longitudinal Study
I first use the HSLS to document how students with different backgrounds apply and sort
into college. The top panel of Figure 1 shows how enrollment rates vary across different
parental income groups and SAT score quartiles.10 Conditional on test score quartile, the
figure shows that student outcomes are correlated with parental income both at the extensive
margin of college attendance, and the intensive margin of college selectivity. For example,
among students in the top SAT score quartile, those with parental income in the bottom
third of the income distribution (less than $35,000) were about twice as likely not to attend
a four-year non-profit college as students in the top sixth of the income distribution. The
data also reveal a similar pattern for college selectivity, where students with SAT scores in
the top quartile who are in the highest income group (the top sixth) are about 10 percentage
points more likely to attend a Highly-selective college compared to students in the lower
income groups.

Next, Figure 2 presents the application behavior of the students in the sample. These
plots show the fraction of students from each parental income group and SAT quartile who
do not apply at all, as well as the fractions who apply to Highly-selective colleges, Nonselective colleges, or both. Looking at applications as opposed to enrollment, the figure
shows that the patterns are very similar. Again, higher-income students are more likely to
apply at all, and the highest-income students are more likely to apply to Highly-selective
colleges conditional on being in the top SAT quartile. This confirms that the gaps in college
enrollment originate from gaps at the application stage. Thus, in order to explain differences
in enrollment, it is necessary to first understand the role of the admissions system in shaping
students’ decisions to apply in the first place.
10

The same figures using GPA instead of SAT scores are presented in Figure 15. Note parental income
is not grouped into quartiles because the surveyed parents in the data reported their income by selecting
from a pre-set range (i.e. less than $15,000; $15,000 to $35,000; $35,000 to $55,000; etc.). The percentages
for each grouping are too coarse to fit neatly into quartiles or quintiles. For reference, the parental income
distribution from the HSLS sample is provided in Figure 13.
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Figure 1: College enrollment by parental income and student SAT/ACT score
Enrollment Rates by Parental Income
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College Type
None/Two-year
Highly-selective

Non-selective

Graphs by Quartiles of SAT

Note: The “<35k” income group corresponds to the bottom third of the parental income distribution in the
HSLS, “35-75k” corresponds to the middle third, and “75-115k” and “>115k” evenly divide the top third of
the distribution.

Figure 2: College application rates
Application Rates by Parental Income
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

1st Quartile SAT

<35k

35-75k

75-115k

2nd Quartile SAT

>115k

<35k

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

3rd Quartile SAT

<35k

35-75k

75-115k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

4th Quartile SAT

>115k

<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

College Type
None/2-Year
Both

Only Non-selective
Only Highly-selective

Graphs by Quartiles of SAT

To study the importance of the application and admissions process in driving the ob13

served attendance gaps, I explore the extent to which the gaps are due specifically to
differences in application rates as opposed to differences in admission rates or enrollment
rates conditional on admission. In order to attend college students must first apply, be
admitted, and then choose which college to enroll in from the set of offers they receive.
Using the student survey responses about admissions and enrollment conditional on being
admitted, I can then determine the relative importance of these post-application steps in
explaining the overall attendance gaps presented in Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 3
shows the relative importance of applications, admissions, and conditional enrollment in
explaining why students do not attend college. While the decision not to apply in the first
place accounts for a large share of why students do not enroll (especially for those in the
third SAT quartile), many students were either not admitted or chose not to attend if they
were admitted. Note that the figure focuses on students in the top half of the SAT distribution because about half of all students in the HSLS attend four-year non-profit colleges,
suggesting that students in the top half of the ability distribution would be the ones who
benefit the most from attending.
Next, to understand the extent to which the overall gaps in attendance rates are driven
by differences in the enrollment process, I decompose the attendance gap between the
highest income group and income group i ∈ {“ < 35k”, “35 − 75k”, “75 − 115k”} into three
components:

i
115k
AttendanceGap115k
= Rattend
− Rattend
i
 i
115k
i
i
= Rapply
− Rapply
Radmit Renroll
{z
}
|
Difference due to application

 115k 115k
 115k i
115k
i
115k
i
+ Radmit
− Radmit
Rapply Renroll + Renroll
− Renroll
Rapply Radmit .
|
{z
} |
{z
}
Difference due to admission

(1.1)

Difference due to enrollment

Here, AttendanceGap115k
corresponds to the difference in total attendance rates between
i
students from the “>115k” income group and income group i (conditional on SAT quartile).
i
i
Rapply
corresponds to the application rate of group i, Radmit
corresponds to the admission
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Figure 3: Reasons student do not enroll in college, and decomposition of enrollment gaps
Percent of students not attending college
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Decomposing income gap in college attendance
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The top panel shows the reasons students in different parental income groups do not attend college
even if they apply. The bottom figure decomposes the extent to which the observed gaps in attendance between students from the “>115k” group and lower income groups is driven by differences
in: (a) application rates, (b) admissions rates, and (c) enrollment rates (conditional on admission).
i
rate of group i (conditional on applying), and Renroll
corresponds to the enrollment rate of

group i (conditional on being admitted).11 As is clear from 1.1, the overall attendance gap
11

i
i
i
i
Note that for each income group i, Rattend
= Rapply
∗ Radmit
∗ Renroll
.
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can be broken down into a component due only to differences in application rates (holding
admission and enrollment rates constant), differences in admissions rates (holding application and enrollment constant), and differences in enrollment conditional on admission.
The decomposition accounts for the role of each step of the application and enrollment
process in shaping the observed college attendance gap, and is illustrated in the bottom
panel of Figure 3. The left-most dark bar in each income group shows the total gap, and
the subsequent bars show which part of the total gap is due to each of the three components.
The figure shows that applications are the biggest component in explaining the attendance
gap for low- and middle-income students. Differences in admissions rates are usually a small
(or slightly negative) part the overall attendance gap, suggesting that high-income students
are not generally accepted to college at higher rates. However, differences in enrollment
rates conditional on admission are also important in explaining the gaps, especially for
middle-income students in the top SAT quartile. Even if offered admission, many students
still choose not to attend college. This may be surprising since applications can be costly for
students in terms of resources and effort, so it is not obvious why students would choose not
to enroll after going through the application process and obtaining an offer of admission. In
Section 1.4, I show that low-income students are less likely to attend their preferred college
due to costs even if admitted, suggesting that financial aid is unpredictable and ex-post
may not be enough to justify enrollment (especially if students face credit constraints).

1.3.1. Application and enrollment of High-ability students
While the analysis so far has highlighted the application and enrollment patterns for all
students in the HSLS, it is helpful to examine the application behavior of very high achieving
students across the different income groups. Recall that the focus of the chapter is not only
on the extensive margin of overall college enrollment, but also in the intensive margin of
college selectivity conditional on enrollment. Since the colleges labeled as ‘Highly-selective’
enroll only 7% of the student population, this section focuses on students at the top of the
ability distribution who are most likely to gain admission at these colleges if they apply.
Similar to Hoxby and Avery (2013), I focus on students who scored at the top 10% among
16

those in the sample who took the SAT (students with a score of at least 1250), and had a
high-school GPA of at least 3.0. This group of ‘High-ability’ students amounts to slightly
more than 6% of the HSLS sample. Thus, if enrollment at the Highly-selective colleges
depended only on a student’s SAT score, all students labeled as High-ability would be
expected to enroll.
Figure 4: College application and enrollment of High-ability students
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The observed enrollment for High-ability students is presented in the top panel of Figure
4. Unsurprisingly, the figure shows that almost all such students enroll in four-year, nonprofit colleges, and that students in the top income group are more likely to attend the
Highly-selective colleges. However, unlike the enrollment patterns from the previous section,
the figure shows that enrollment at Highly-selective colleges is U-shaped in parental income:
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low-income students are more likely to attend Highly-selective colleges than lower middleincome students and equally likely to attend compared to upper middle-income students.
This finding is consistent with the notion of the “missing middle” in selective colleges usually
found in the empirical literature,12 where very high achieving low-income students enroll at
Highly-selective colleges at relatively high rates due to generous financial aid for students
at the bottom. Turning to the bottom panel of Figure 4 to examine application decisions,
there is a similar pattern: application rates to Highly-selective colleges first decrease in
parental income then quickly increase so that the highest income group has the highest
application rates overall.
Comparing the enrollment and application rates from Figure 4, it is clear that many students who apply to Highly-selective colleges do not end up enrolling. To shed more light on
what happens between application and enrollment stages, I follow the same steps as before
to determine the extent to which students do not enroll in Highly-selective colleges because
they are not admitted, or because they choose not to attend even if offered admission. The
top panel of Figure 5 shows that most students who do not enroll never apply in the first
place, and there is a significant number of students who choose not to enroll even if they
are admitted. While many students reported not being admitted to the Highly-selective
colleges they applied to, the gap between application rates and enrollment rates (conditional
on income group) appears to mostly be driven by decisions not to enroll after receiving an
offer of admission.

Next, I explore the extent to which the attendance gaps between High-ability highand low-income students at Highly-selective colleges is due to applications, admissions, or
enrollment conditional on admissions. I use the same attendance decomposition introduced
in Equation 1.1 for the sample of High-ability students, and present the results in the bottom
panel of Figure 5. The figure shows that differences in application rates are the largest
component in explaining the attendance gap between high- and lower-income students.
12

See, for example Chetty et al. (2020).
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Figure 5: Reasons High-ability student do not enroll in Highly-selective colleges, and an
enrollment gap decomposition
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The top panel shows the reasons High-ability students in different parental income groups do not
attend Highly-selective colleges. The bottom figure decomposes the extent to which these observed
attendance gaps between the “>115k” group and lower income groups are driven by differences in:
(a) application rates, (b) admissions rates, and (c) enrollment rates (conditional on admission).

This is especially true for the lowest income group, where differences in application rates
account for more than the entire gap. The importance of applications in explaining the gap
for low-income students is consistent with Hoxby and Avery (2013), who argue that many
high-achieving, low-income students do not attend highly selective college only because they
do not apply in the first place.
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Importantly, the bottom panel of Figure 5 also shows that middle-income students are
less likely to enroll in Highly-selective colleges conditional on being admitted relative to
high-income students. Even when offered admission to a Highly-selective college, middleincome students are more likely to choose to enroll in a Non-selective college instead. Similar
to the previous section, this is somewhat surprising since it can be quite costly to apply
to Highly-selective colleges. For example, students who decide to apply to such colleges
have to expend effort to get a competitive SAT score (which may require taking the test
multiple times), and write additional essays on top of their general college essay. Since postadmission enrollment decisions appear to be important in explaining the college attendance
gap (and may explain why students would choose not to apply in the first place), I study
these decisions more carefully in the next section.

1.4. Financial Aid Uncertainty and College Enrollment Conditional on Admission
In this section, I document how students who are admitted to college choose among their
options, taking into account student preferences and college costs. I provide evidence that
in addition to admissions being uncertain for students at the time of application, financial
aid can be uncertain as well. Even if students were admitted to their top choice among the
colleges they applied to, many chose to enroll in a different college since they did not receive
sufficient financial aid from their most preferred one. The evidence in this section thus
supports the hypothesis that college costs are an important driver of application decisions:
since students may not be able to enroll even after being admitted, it will then be rational
for many not to apply in the first place.
Recall that in the HSLS survey, students were asked to list the names of two colleges they
had applied to and were seriously considering (in addition to the college they decided to
attend). Students were also asked whether they were admitted to these other listed colleges,
and which of them was their most preferred choice overall if not for costs. Importantly,
students were also asked to indicate their most preferred school if not for costs among the
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set of colleges they were admitted to. The answers to these questions then are used see if
students were likely to be admitted to their top choice, or if they were likely to attend their
most preferred college conditional on being admitted.

1.4.1. Enrollment at four-year non-profit colleges
I first focus on students who were admitted to at least one four-year non-profit college.
Table 2 reports statistics on outcomes for these students, and how they vary by parental
income. The table includes information such as the average number of applications sent,
student SAT scores in comparison to the median SAT score of the college attended or most
preferred, and the fraction of students who chose to attend college conditional on admission.
The table shows that higher-income students typically send more college applications and
have higher average SAT scores. They also have SAT scores that are closer to the median
SAT score of the college they attend, and are significantly more likely to attend four-year,
non-profit colleges (with an attendance gap of more than 10 percentage points between
students in the top sixth and bottom third of the income distribution).
Importantly, Table 2 also shows that higher-income students are much more likely to
attend their most preferred college among the set of colleges accepted to. This is further
illustrated in the top panel of Figure 17, which shows a strong negative relationship between
a student’s total family income and the likelihood that the admitted student does not attend
their preferred college due to cost. Moreover, this negative relationship is present even for
very high achieving students as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 17, which conditions
on students who scored at least a 1300 on their SATs. Assuming that all admitted students
have the potential to succeed in college, these findings suggest that financial constraints
may create a mis-allocation in the college market. Instead of enrolling in the four-year
college that they most prefer, qualified low-income students may be investing sub-optimally
in their human capital by choosing to enter the labor market, attend a two-year college, or
attend a less selective four-year college.
To better understand the decision not to enroll conditional on being admitted, Table
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Table 2: Characteristics of students accepted to any four-year non-profit college.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

3.4

3.3

3.7

4.3

Attending four-year non-profit

79.8%

86.4%

88.5%

91.6%

Admitted to preferred college

85.0%

87.0%

86.8%

87.4%

Average SAT

952

1015

1065

1109

Attending college SAT gap

-52

-33

-12

-4

Preferred college SAT gap (if not admitted)

-186

-189

-147

-147

64.8%

67.7%

72.2%

77.2%

Upper bound

10.1

13.5

18.3

22.5

Lower bound

11.0

15.0

19.6

22.5

Number of Applications

Attending most preferred
college admitted to
Cost of college attending*

Note: ‘Attending college SAT gap’ refers to the difference between a student’s SAT score and the median
SAT score of the college they attend.
*College costs ($1,000s per year) are obtained from IPEDS (2013 data), and are equal to room and board
plus net tuition which is averaged by different parental income groups. I provide an upper and lower bound
for the costs each student would be expected to pay using the parental income data from the HSLS. Note
that for public colleges, cost data correspond only to the in-state tuition level. If the student was attending
a public college out-of-state, the corresponding costs are considered missing and not included in the average.

3 provides a number of statistics to compare students who did not attend their preferred
college (due to costs) and those who did despite the costs. Comparing the top and bottom
panels, the table shows that students who did not attend their preferred college were much
less likely to attend a four-year, non-profit college at all. This is especially the case for lowincome students, for whom almost half would have preferred to attend college but choose
not to even after being admitted. It is also worth noting that in addition to the less preferred
colleges being less costly, they are also on average less selective: for all income groups, the
gap between a student’s SAT and the median SAT of the college they prefer is larger than
the same gap for the college they ultimately chose to attend. That is, a student’s preferred
college is on average a “reach” school (especially if the student is low-income) since it has a
median SAT that is generally higher than the student’s own SAT score. Although a college’s
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financial aid generosity and median SAT score are correlated, financial aid at these “reach”
colleges was not sufficiently high ex-post for the students to attend.
Table 3: Importance of college costs in enrollment decisions after admissions.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

55.4%

68.1%

70.0%

73.7%

Cost of college attending

8.5

12.8

17.9

20.8

Cost of college preferred

11.8

14.9

21.4

27.4

Cost of college attending

9.3

14.2

19.1

20.8

Cost of college preferred

12.4

16.3

22.7

27.4

College attending

-5

-26

2
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College preferred

-100

-68

-48

-37

93.5%

95.3%

95.6%

97.0%

-68

-35

-16

-10

Not attending preferred college
(due to cost)
Attending four-year non-profit
College cost* (lower bound)

College cost* (upper bound)

Median SAT gap

Attending preferred college
Attending four-year non-profit
Median SAT gap

Note: The ‘preferred college’ is the one each student said was their most preferred choice (excluding costs)
among the set of colleges they were admitted to. ‘Median SAT gap’ refers to the difference between a
student’s SAT score and the median SAT score of the college they either chose to attend or the one they
most prefer.
*College costs ($1,000s per year) are obtained from IPEDS (2013 data), and are equal to room and board
plus net tuition which is averaged by different parental income groups. I provide an upper and lower bound
for the costs each student would be expected to pay using the parental income data from the HSLS. Note
that for public colleges, cost data correspond only to the in-state tuition level. If the student was attending
a public college out-of-state, the corresponding costs are considered missing and not included in the average.

Finally, Table 3 also includes measures of expected costs for each parental income group
at the attending college compared to the preferred college calculated using 2013 IPEDS
data. The merged data show, on average, how large the differences in cost are between
the attending and preferred colleges. Since the parental income groups set by IPEDS in
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determining net tuition are slightly different the groups set in the HSLS, I provide an upper
and lower bound for the total cost a student from each group can expect to pay. It is
important to note that these costs are calculated at the college level, not the student level.
All institutional grants are averaged out for the college-level statistics, and it is possible
that individual students might not have qualified for certain grants and chose not to attend
as a result. Nonetheless, the table still shows that the preferred colleges that were not chosen because of cost are generally more expensive for all students regardless of income group.

1.4.2. Enrollment at Highly-selective colleges
Having documented the enrollment behavior of students admitted to any four-year, nonprofit college, I now turn to students admitted to at least one Highly-selective college. These
students are of interest because of the possibility of a mis-match between student ability
and college quality, so it is important to study the intensive margin choice of college quality
conditional on enrollment. As discussed before, I measure college quality by using Barron’s
2015 Profile of American Colleges to divide colleges into tiers: the ‘Highly-selective’ group,
which includes colleges ranked by Barron’s as ‘most competitive’ or ‘highly competitive’, and
the ‘Non-selective’ group, which consists of all other four-year non-profit colleges. Compared
to the last subsection which focused on college enrollment overall, I now focus on a student’s
decision to enroll in a Highly-selective college conditional on being admitted to one.
Table 4 shows the characteristics of students who were admitted to any Highly-selective
college. First, the table shows that the number of applications such students sent is similar
across the different income groups, and there is a small gradient in income for SAT scores.
Importantly, the lower-income students were less likely to actually attend a Highly-selective
college, and were also more likely to report that they were not attending their most preferred
college (among the set of colleges admitted to) due to cost.13 While it is possible that low13
This is illustrated further in the top panel of Figure 18, which shows a negative relationship between the
fraction of students who do not attend their preferred college, and a student’s total family income (conditional
on being admitted to at least one Highly-selective college). Figure 18 shows that this relationship holds for
high-achieving students who scored at least 1300 on their SAT (which would put them in the top 10% of
the typical SAT score distribution).
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Table 4: Statistics for students accepted to Highly-selective four-year non-profit college.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

5.3

5.2

5.2

5.6

Attending Highly-selective

57.6%

65.4%

61.0%

67.2%

Admitted to preferred college

82.6%

77.9%

89.8%

86.3%

1150

1169

1211

1239

-32

-45

3

8

23.4%

26.4%

21.4%

17.2%

65.8%

73.3%

67.8%

71.1%

21.0%

17.5%

15.9%

11.3%

Upper bound

11.9

14.6

20.0

27.2

Lower bound

13.1

16.2

23.1

27.2

Number of Applications

Average SAT
Attending college SAT gap
Not attending most preferred
college admitted to*
Preferred college admitted
to is Highly-selective
Not attending Highly-selective
but prefer it
Cost of college attending**

* Refers to the fraction of students who reported that they did not attend their most preferred college
(among the set of colleges admitted to) due to cost.
** College costs ($1,000s per year) are obtained from IPEDS (2013 data), and are equal to room and board
plus net tuition which is averaged by different parental income groups. I provide an upper and lower bound
for the costs each student would be expected to pay using the parental income data from the HSLS. Note
that for public colleges, cost data correspond only to the in-state tuition level. If the student was attending
a public college out-of-state, the corresponding costs are considered missing and not included in the average.

income students were more likely to prefer less selective colleges, the next row of Table 4
shows that there is not a discernible trend in preferences for Highly-selective colleges across
the different income groups. Conditional on preferring a Highly-selective college, however,
the table also shows that there is a strong relationship between a student’s income and
their attendance rate at Highly-selective colleges.14 The lowest-income group, for example,
is about twice as likely not to attend a Highly-selective college as the top income group
despite being admitted to one and preferring one.
14

See the bottom of Figure 19 to see how this relationship varies across all reported income groups.
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Finally, among students who were admitted to any Highly-selective college, Table 5 compares students who did not attend their preferred college (among colleges admitted to) and
those who did. The table shows that students who do not attend are unsurprisingly less
likely to enroll in a Highly-selective college, and choose colleges that are on average less expensive. These students are also somewhat ‘over-matched’ with the colleges they chose to
attend, meaning that they have SAT scores that are higher on average than other students
in the college. Importantly, the colleges they preferred but did not attend generally have median SAT scores that are higher than their own scores. Assuming that colleges with higher
scores have better academic programs and that students face financial constraints, these
results suggest that there is mis-match at the intensive margin: high-achieving students
would like to attend higher quality colleges but are unable to do so because of costs.
Overall, these findings are in contrast to Hoxby and Avery (2013), who argue that high
achieving low-income students should be able to enroll at Highly-selective colleges at equal
rates because they are known to provide generous financial aid. Instead, these findings
suggests that the high observed financial aid is not only unpredictable, but also specific
to the select group of low-income students who actually end up enrolling at these Highlyselective colleges.15 The results in this section thus support the hypothesis that student
application decisions are motivated by roughly correct expectations about cost: if many
low-income students who are admitted to Highly-selective colleges are still less likely to
enroll, it may be rational for other low-income students not to submit a costly application
in the first place if they expect to similarly not receive enough aid.
15

Note that there is a positive relationship between financial aid generosity and college selectivity, as
shown in Figure 14. While it is well known that colleges at the top like Harvard and Yale provide very
generous aid to all low-income students, many other elite colleges use limited merit-based aid that depends
on a student’s application and is therefore uncertain at the time of application. Thus, average net-tuition
for Highly-selective colleges outside of the very top is generally higher.
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Table 5: Importance of college costs in enrollment decisions after being admitted to a
Highly-selective college.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

42.5%

34.0%

37.5%

49.1%

Cost of college attending

9.5

13.2

20.1

26.2

Cost of college preferred

14.8

18.1

25.3

36.3

Cost of college attending

10.6

14.5

22.7

26.2

Cost of college preferred

15.7

19.1

28.6

36.3

College attending

13

-8

60

44

College preferred

-69

-70

-67

-44

63.3%

78.3%

68.6%

72.0%

-47

-58

-13

-1

Not attending preferred college
(due to cost)
Attending Highly-selective
College cost* (lower bound)

College cost* (upper bound)

Median SAT gap

Attending preferred college
Attending Highly-selective
Median SAT gap

Note: The “preferred college” is the one each student said was their most preferred choice (excluding
costs) among the set of colleges they were admitted to. ‘Attending College’ refers to the fraction of students
attending any four-year non-profit colleges or universities. ‘Median SAT gap’ refers to the difference between
a student’s SAT score and the median SAT score of the college they either chose to attend or the one they
most prefer.
*College costs ($1,000s per year) are obtained from IPEDS (2013 data), and are equal to room and board
plus net tuition which is averaged by different parental income groups. I provide an upper and lower bound
for the costs each student would be expected to pay using the parental income data from the HSLS. Note
that for public colleges, cost data correspond only to the in-state tuition level. If the student was attending
a public college out-of-state, the corresponding costs are considered missing and not included in the average.

1.5. Determinants of College Application and Enrollment Decisions
Motivated by the importance of the admissions system in explaining the income gaps in
college attendance, this section studies the factors correlated with a student’s application
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and enrollment decisions using a series of logit models. The goal of the analysis is to control
for many covariates alongside parental income including measures of student ability, student
demographic information such as parental education, and high-school level characteristics.
The first set of logit models analyze student application decisions both at the extensive
margin for whether the student applied at all, and the intensive margin of their portfolio
choice conditional on applying. The second set of models analyzes enrollment decisions for
students who were admitted to any four-year non-profit college, and those admitted to any
Highly-selective college. It is important to note that the results in this section should be
interpreted as being descriptive rather than causal, since the variation in parental income
and the other covariates may not be exogenous.

1.5.1. Factors correlated with application decisions
The first set of logit models focus on a student’s application choice at both the extensive
margin and intensive margins. Table 6 shows the resulting coefficients from each model
expressed as odds ratios and provides standard errors for all the estimates. The left columns
of Table 6 focuses on the extensive margin application choice: the dependent variable is
equal to one if the student chose to apply to any four-year non-profit colleges, and zero
otherwise. The table shows that both the main variables of interest, parental income and
student ability, are statistically significant factors in determining a student’s decision to
apply to college.
To aid in interpreting the magnitude of the relationship between parental income and
a student’s decision to apply, the top panel of Figure 20 plots the predicted application
probabilities implied by the estimates for different parental income levels and SAT scores.
Note that in calculating the predicted probabilities, the values of all other variables are set
to their respective means. Figure 20 shows that the estimates imply a strong statistical
relationship between parental income and applications at any SAT score. For example, a
student in the 35-55k income group (the median in the sample) is about 5% less likely to
apply than a student in the 115-135k income group.
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Table 6: Logit estimation results for student application decisions and application portfolio
choice

Dependent Variable

Apply to

Apply at all

Highly-selective
Coefficient

Coefficient

SE

Parental Income

1.102

(0.018)

1.004

(0.019)

SAT (standardized)

1.549∗∗∗

(0.173)

2.111∗∗∗

(0.302)

GPA (standardized)

2.925

∗∗∗

(0.195)

∗∗∗

2.167

(0.187)

Parental Income*SAT

1.037∗

(0.022)

1.062∗∗∗

(0.018)

(0.392)

∗∗∗

2.358

(0.369)

(0.506)

2.357∗∗∗

(0.459)

∗∗∗

∗∗

Asian

1.756

Black

3.323∗∗∗
∗∗∗

Hispanic

1.768

(0.215)

2.191

(0.378)

Other

1.367∗∗

(0.216)

1.259∗∗∗

(0.190)

∗∗

Female

1.096

(0.091)

0.802

(0.073)

Parent has HS diploma or GED

1.241

(0.206)

0.961

(0.300)

Parent has Associate’s

1.231

(0.228)

1.023

(0.327)

Parent has Bachelor’s

1.337

(0.241)

1.336

(0.418)

Parent has Master’s or higher

1.507∗∗

(0.299)

1.533

(0.490)

Number in student’s household

0.975∗

(0.015)

0.970

(0.029)

High School is Catholic

4.369∗∗∗

(0.835)

1.175

(0.163)

∗∗∗

∗∗

High School is (other) private

2.283

(0.443)

1.357

(0.194)

Percent in HS receiving free lunch

0.989

(0.021)

0.992

(0.024)

Suburban

0.910

(0.110)

0.837

(0.104)

Town

0.559∗∗∗

(0.078)

0.448∗∗∗

∗

∗

(0.076)

Rural

0.819

(0.095)

0.569

(0.068)

Midwest region

1.016

(0.142)

0.592∗∗∗

(0.084)

∗∗∗

(0.076)

South region

0.826

(0.113)

0.490

West region

0.684∗∗

(0.108)

0.501∗∗∗

(0.090)

(0.513)

0.524

(0.241)

∗

Constant

1.740

N
Psuedo R
***

SE

∗∗∗

p < 0.01,

**

2

11,406

8,958

0.247

0.264

p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In the right columns, the sample is restricted to students who applied to

any four-year, non-profit colleges. Highly-selective colleges are categorized as “most competitive” or “highly
competitive” by Barron’s 2015 Profile of American Colleges. Note that the coefficients are expressed as odds
ratios. Parental income is coded based on pre-set ranges that parents chose from in the survey: “< $15k,
$15k to $35k, $35k to $55k, . . . , $215k to $235k, > $235k”.
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The left column of Table 6 also shows other important factors that are correlated with
student application decisions. Race, for example, has a positive and statistically significant
effect. Black and Hispanic students are substantially more likely to apply to college relative
to white students, perhaps due to presence of affirmative action policies. The table also
shows that conditional on student ability, parental education also has a positive effect but
is only statistically significant for the highest education level. Finally, the table also shows
that high-school level characteristics are important, as students at Catholic or other private
schools are significantly more likely to apply compared to those at public schools. The
estimates also suggest that students at high-schools with a higher share receiving subsidized
lunches are less likely to apply, though the effect is not statistically significant.
The right column of Table 6 investigates the intensive margin application decision by
studying factors correlated with a student’s application portfolio choice. The sample is
restricted to students who applied to any four-year, non-profit colleges and the dependant
variable is equal to one if the student applied to any Highly-selective colleges and zero
otherwise. The table reveals similar patterns compared to the extensive margin choice,
where both SAT and GPA are strongly correlated with the decision to apply to a Highlyselective college. Note that parental income by itself has very little effect and is statistically
insignificant, but the interaction between SAT scores and income is highly significant.
To aid in interpreting the estimates for the intensive margin application decision, the
bottom panel of Figure 20 plots the predicted application probabilities for different SAT
scores and parental income levels. The figure illustrates the importance of the interaction
between test scores and income: application rates to Highly-selective colleges are flat in
parental income for students with low SAT scores, but there is a strong correlation between
parental income and applications to selective colleges for students at the top of the SAT
score distribution. For example, moving from the median income group of 35-55k to the
115-135k income group (an increase of about 1.5 standard deviations) is associated with
roughly a 10% increase in the probability that an average student with a 90th percentile
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SAT will apply to a Highly-selective college.
The right column of Table 6 also shows other variables correlated with a student’s choice
to apply to any Highly-selective colleges conditional on applying at all. It shows that nonwhite students are significantly more likely to apply to selective colleges, which is likely due
to the use of affirmative action policies. Note also that while parental education still has
a positive effect, it is no longer statistically significant. Moreover, the effect of attending a
private high-school is also substantially lower for the decision to apply to a Highly-selective
college compared to the decision to apply to any. Finally, the table shows that students in
regions outside of the east coast are substantially less likely to apply to a selective college.
This may be the case because many Highly-selective colleges are concentrated in the East
coast and students may prefer to attend a college that is closer geographically.

1.5.2. Factors correlated with enrollment decisions
Finally, Table 7 examines the importance of costs in affecting enrollment behavior conditional on admission. The table shows the results for two separate logit models where the
dependent variable is equal to one if the student noted that they were unable to attend
their preferred college due cost and zero otherwise. The left columns restrict the sample to all students who were admitted to any four-year, non-profit colleges, and the right
columns restrict to students who were admitted to any Highly-selective college. Note that
the coefficients are again presented as odds ratios.
The estimates in Table 7 show that under both sample restrictions, students with lower
parental income are more likely to be unable to enroll in their preferred college due to costs.
These estimates are robust to controlling for many other student characteristics including
measures of ability. Note that the effect of income on enrollment is bigger for the group
of students admitted to Highly-selective colleges, which is likely due to the higher tuition
these colleges typically charge. Overall, these results suggest that financial aid is insufficient:
even when offered admissions, low-income students were less likely to be able to attend their
preferred college due to costs.
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Table 7: Estimation results for whether admitted students did not enroll in their preferred
college due to costs
Dependent Variable: Student did not enroll in their preferred college due to costs
Accepted to any
four-year non-profit
Coefficient

Highly-selective
Coefficient

SE

Parental Income

0.966∗∗

(0.015)

0.930∗∗∗

(0.024)

SAT (standardized)

0.966

(0.061)

0.947

(0.120)

GPA (standardized)

1.013

(0.077)

1.019

(0.168)
∗

Asian

1.275

(0.216)

1.541

Black

1.313∗

(0.209)

2.116∗∗∗

(0.775)

Hispanic

1.236

(0.193)

1.437

(0.483)

Other

1.346∗

(0.208)

2.247∗∗

(0.853)

∗∗

(0.125)

∗∗

(0.395)

Female

1.218

(0.106)

0.692

Parent has HS diploma or GED

1.113

(0.264)

1.616

(0.910)

Parent has Associate’s

1.039

(0.260)

2.012

(1.266)

Parent has Bachelor’s

0.889

(0.214)

1.577

(0.902)

Parent has Master’s or higher

0.721

(0.180)

1.210

(0.697)

Number in student’s household

1.037

(0.026)

1.018

(0.024)

High School is Catholic

1.278∗

(0.179)

1.405

(0.370)

High School is (other) private

1.034

(0.172)

0.705

(0.204)

Percent in HS receiving free lunch

1.039∗

(0.023)

0.965

(0.045)

Suburban

1.030

(0.127)

1.042

(0.237)

Town

1.231

(0.189)

1.876∗

(0.668)

Rural

0.928

(0.114)

1.040

(0.286)

Midwest region

0.758∗∗

(0.099)

0.775

(0.197)

South region

0.829

(0.111)

1.212

(0.310)

West region

1.037

(0.172)

0.912

(0.310)

(0.068)

0.427

(0.301)

∗∗∗

Constant

0.198

N
Psuedo R
***

SE

Accepted to any

p < 0.01,

**

2

7,741

2,071

0.023

0.045

p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The sample is restricted to all students who applied to any four-year, non-

profit colleges. The dependant variable is equal to 1 if the student applied to any Highly-selective colleges
(labeled as “most competitive” or “highly competitive” by Barron’s 2015 Profile of American Colleges) as 0
otherwise. Note that the coefficients are expressed as odds ratios. Parental income is coded based on pre-set
ranges that parents chose from in the survey: “< $15k, $15k to $35k, $35k to $55k, . . . , $215k to $235k,
> $235k”.
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1.6. Conclusion
To summarize, this chapter finds that there is a strong correlation between college attendance and parental income at both the extensive margin of overall enrollment, and the
intensive margin of college selectivity. The analysis suggests that these gaps are largely due
to differences in how students apply and choose to enroll rather than differences in admission rates. When interviewed about their preferences over the colleges they were admitted
to, low-income students on average wanted to attend higher quality colleges but could not
due to costs. The results in this chapter suggest that despite the presence of financial aid,
credit constraints may keep low-income students from attending more selective colleges even
if they are admitted. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that low-income students
are less likely to apply because they do not expect to receive sufficient financial aid.
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CHAPTER 2 : College Admissions and the MisAllocation of Talent1
2.1. Introduction
Investment in college education is important for human capital accumulation, earnings
growth, and can be a powerful tool for social mobility. Despite the benefits of completing
college, however, there are well documented gaps in college outcomes across the parental
income distribution. Students born to parents from the bottom quartile of family income are
much less likely to complete college than students from the top of the distribution (Bailey
and Dynarski 2011) and are far less likely to be represented at more selective colleges
(Chetty et al. 2020). While these gaps can partly be explained by differences in levels of
preparedness, gaps remain even for high-achieving students.
One explanation for these gaps is that they arise from differences in application rates
between low- and high-income students. Empirical studies such as Hoxby and Avery (2013)
and Dillon and Smith (2017) find that there is substantial undermatching at the application
stage: low-income students tend to apply to schools that they appear overqualified for
relative to their higher-income peers. That is, low-income students appear to be underrepresented in selective colleges not because they are excluded directly but because they
do not apply in the first place. This finding is troubling because it suggests that student
misallocation may exist not only at the extensive margin of overall college enrollment, but
also at the intensive margin of college quality conditional on enrollment. Moreover, as
Hoxby and Avery (2013) note, the gap in application rates is puzzling since many selective
colleges provide substantial need-based financial aid to low-income students.
Why even after controlling for test scores, do we observe different application patterns
for students across the income distribution? Our paper examines the hypothesis that col1

Co-authored with Ricardo Marto.

34

lege admissions and financial aid policies effectively limit the share of low-income student
enrollment, making it rational for them to apply at lower rates since they would not expect
to receive sufficient aid. To study this hypothesis, we build and estimate a novel model of
the college market featuring an application and admissions system similar to the one used
by U.S. colleges. While colleges in the model value high-ability students, it is costly for
them to offer generous financial aid to all low-income applicants: they face a trade-off between admitting high-ability, low-income students and admitting lower-ability, high-income
students who are willing to pay full tuition. This trade-off will cause colleges to offer generous aid only to the highest-ability students among their low-income applicant pool. Thus,
low-income students will find it optimal to apply at lower rates because they recognize that
they have a low chance of receiving sufficient financial aid.
Our paper proceeds in two parts. First, we empirically study application and enrollment
patterns using the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS), a recent dataset which
tracks student transitions from high-school to college. We find that low-income students are
less likely to apply to college conditional on ability, confirming the findings of the previous
literature. Moreover, we find that applicants face substantial risk in not receiving enough financial aid after being admitted: almost a quarter of admitted students indicated that they
did not attend their preferred college due to costs. Second, we build an equilibrium model
of the college market featuring a noisy application and admissions system, and estimate
it using both student and college level data. We show that our model is able to account
quantitatively for the application and enrollment patterns observed in the data, with realistic tuition schedules that vary based on students’ parental income and test-scores. We use
the model to study the role of the admissions system in shaping the allocation of students
in the college market and study the effect of higher education policies in our environment.
Through the lens of our model, we find that selective colleges offer generous aid to lowincome students because only the highest-ability among them apply, making the colleges
confident that their low-income applicants are likely to be high-ability. Additionally, we find
that making applications less informative would lower merit-based financial aid and reduce
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admissions standards, hurting all high-ability students and modestly benefiting low-ability,
high-income students.
In the empirical part of the paper, we use our recent student-level data to show that
conditional on ability, low-income students are less likely to enroll in college and less likely
to attend highly selective colleges conditional on enrolling. Consistent with the previous
literature, we find that these gaps originate from differences in application rates rather than
admissions rates. To shed more light on student application decisions, we then examine
enrollment choices after the students have been admitted and can see their financial aid
packages. At this stage, we find that low-income students are less likely to attend their
preferred college due to cost, and generally choose to attend less selective colleges as a
result. Overall, our findings suggests that while financial aid at selective colleges may be
high for students who choose to enroll, it is generally insufficient for those who are only
admitted. These results support our hypothesis for why low-income students apply less in
the first place: if applications are costly, students will not find applying worthwhile if they
do not expect to be offered sufficient financial aid.
Motivated by these facts, we then develop an equilibrium model of the college market
featuring student heterogeneity, college competition, and a decentralized admissions system.
Colleges differ by the value they add to students in the labor market. Students, who differ
by their innate ability and parental transfers, choose to apply to a subset of colleges or
not apply at all. Applications are costly, and if a student decides to apply they then send
a noisy signal of their ability to the colleges. Each college has its own threshold for the
minimum acceptable signal necessary for admissions, and each college charges a tuition
level that varies based on a student’s financial resources and signal. Thus admissions and
financial aid are risky for the students, and they make their application decision based on
expectations over the possible signal realizations. Finally, once the signal is realized and
students have offers from the colleges they were accepted to, they decide which college to
attend if they choose to enroll.
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On supply side of the market, there are a discrete number of colleges who differ in their
technology, endowment income, and costs. The objective of the colleges is to maximize
the value they add to their students, which depends on the level of instructional spending
per student and the average ability of the student body. To capture the uncertainty of the
admissions process, we assume that colleges are unable to observe the true ability of the
students in their applicant pool but instead observe only the noisy signal mentioned above.
Thus, the admissions system is modeled as a signal extraction problem for the colleges.
To maximize their objective, colleges choose their minimum acceptable signal (admissions
standard) and tuition schedules. When colleges compete, they take as given the admissions
standards and tuition schedules of the other colleges. Thus, their pricing decisions are
limited by students’ outside options if their applicant pool is likely to contain students who
applied to multiple colleges.
Combining the signal extraction problem of the colleges with their ability to price discriminate is new to our model, and introduces an important mechanism that influences
the degree of price discrimination due to the signal. Colleges can fully observe a student’s
parental transfer, and while they do not observe ability directly, we assume they know the
joint distribution of income and ability among their applicants (they take student application choices as given in equilibrium). Thus, if only the highest-ability low-income students
choose to apply, signals from low-income students will be more informative to the college
because they are more likely to have come from high-ability students. Colleges will then
offer high financial aid to the low-income students they enroll because they are confident
that such students are high-ability. This mechanism helps explain why we observe both low
application rates and high financial aid for low-income students.
We estimate our model using various student- and college-level data sources available
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). These datasets provide us with
details on student applications, enrollment, and financial aid, as well as details on collegelevel variables including tuition revenue, categorized expenses, and endowment income.
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When we take the model to the data, we find that it is able to account for the different
application and enrollment rates observed across the parental income distribution. It is also
able to capture the variation in tuition both across and within colleges, with low-income
students receiving significant levels of financial aid at selective colleges.
Next, we use the model to study the effect of the application and admissions system
on student allocations in the college market. We first examine the equilibrium effect of
low-income student application decisions to study the importance of signal informativeness
in our model. We solve for the equilibrium of a counterfactual economy where low-income
students are as likely to apply to selective colleges as their higher income peers. Since
high-income students are more likely to apply at any ability level, this introduces lowability students to the low-income applicant pool, which makes the signals of high-ability
low-income students less informative. In response, selective colleges reduce financial aid for
all low-income students since the applicant pool has worsened. We find that this effective
increase in tuition reduces low-income student enrollment at the selective colleges by about a
quarter. This finding highlights that in the model, high-ability, low-income students benefit
greatly from the increased signal informativeness that results from the low application rates
of low-ability, low-income students. Thus, interventions that encourage low-income students
to apply may actually reduce their overall enrollment in selective colleges if the interventions
are not targeted by ability.
We also study the effects of application signals becoming less informative, motivated
by recent decisions to pause the use of standardized tests in response to the Covid-19
pandemic. To do this, we recalculate a counterfactual equilibrium where we increase the
noise associated with student applications, making it more difficult for colleges to infer the
students’ true ability. We find that in the new equilibrium, colleges endogenously reduce
their admissions standards and merit-based financial aid, making students at the top of
the ability distribution worse off as they now have a lower chance of being admitted to
the selective colleges. High-ability, low-income students are particularly harmed because
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of the reduction in merit-based financial aid. The only students who have modest gains
from the less informative signals are the low-ability, high-income students who now find it
easier to be admitted. Low-ability, low-income students have little net-change in welfare
because the gains they experience from the increased admissions rates are offset by the
losses they experience from lower financial aid. Overall, the gains that accrue to the lowability students are not enough to offset the losses to the high-ability students who benefit
the most from attending college, leading to overall welfare losses.
Finally, we study the effects of a large expansion in the federal Pell Grant program, which
would increase the amount of grant funding to low-income students and make middle-income
students eligible for federal aid. We find that the policy change is most beneficial to highability low- and middle-income students who were before less likely to apply and enroll
due to credit constraints. Conditional on ability, the increase in grants flattens student
enrollment profiles across the parental income distribution. This considerably reduces the
concentration of the income distribution in selective colleges, but gaps remain since income
and ability are correlated in the student population. In terms of welfare, we find that
high-ability low-income students benefit while higher-income students are worse off due to
the higher tax rate and increased competition with the newly unconstrained lower-income
students. Overall, we find that the policy has a net-positive effect on welfare since the
value of a college education is higher for the high-ability, low-income students who benefit
compared to the lower-ability, high-income students they replace. Moreover, we find that
the admissions system substantially dampens the welfare gains of the policy because in the
presence of admissions risk there is a chance that affected students will not be admitted
and will therefore be ineligible for the federal aid. Failing to account for the presence of the
admissions system would lead the welfare gains to be overstated by more than a factor of
two.
Related literature. This paper builds on three different strands of literature. The first
is the large empirical literature documenting inequality in higher education and the role of
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applications and the admissions system. The second relates to the literature on structural
models of the college market and the college admissions problem. The third relates to the
literature which studies the distributional effects of education policies.
Our paper is complementary to the empirical literature on the college market and its
outcomes. Recent work by Chetty et al. (2020) documents a large degree of income segregation within and across U.S. colleges. Relatedly, work by Hoxby and Avery (2013), Hoxby
and Turner (2013), Dillon and Smith (2017), and Delaney and Devereux (2020) document
differences in application behavior related to differences in family income and student ability. Dynarski et al. (2018) further study the role of expectations about financial-aid at
the application stage by conducting an experiment where low-income, high-achieving high
school students were encouraged to apply the University of Michigan with the promise of
full tuition scholarships over four years if admitted. They find significantly higher application and enrollment rates among their treated group, in contrast to Bettinger et al. (2012)
who examine the effect of providing information without making any commitments and find
no effect on student applications. These findings are consistent with our results about the
importance of expectations about financial aid in driving student application decisions.2
Our model builds on the work of Epple et al. (2006, 2017), who consider qualitymaximizing colleges that price discriminate among students to study the effect financial
aid policies. Gordon and Hedlund (2016, 2021) build on that framework to study the rise
in college tuition, showing that demand forces help explain much of the increase. Similar
to these papers, we assume that colleges compete monopolistically and choose a tuition
schedule to maximize their value-added, which depends on the composition of their students. Importantly, our model also draws on Chade et al. (2014), who introduce matching
frictions in the college admissions problem, and allow students to make multiple college ap2

Note that in Dynarski et al. (2018) the treated low-income students were already likely to receive
full tuition, need-based scholarships without the intervention, suggesting that these students simply lacked
information and did not have correct expectations about financial aid. However, we note that the treated
students were also informed that they were likely to qualify for additional merit-based financial aid, which
would have caused them to revise their expectations upward relative to the control group.
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plications. Our model complements Fu (2014), who jointly models tuition and admissions,
by adding the important margin of heterogeneity in parental income and credit constraints.
Similarly, our work also complements Fillmore (2020), who studies the effect of different
FAFSA information disclosure policies on tuition levels. Several recent papers have also
studied the college market and its interaction with inequality and intergenerational mobility. Cai and Heathcote (2018) study the role of income inequality in explaining recent
tuition increases using a novel model that gives rise to an endogenous distribution of colleges. Using a similar framework, Capelle (2019) studies the role of the college market in
shaping intergenerational mobility for heterogeneous students.
An important assumption in our model is the role of peer-effects in determining the value
of a college. There is evidence that students benefit from having better peers. For example,
Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), and Carrell et al. (2009) all use random assignment
among students and find positive effects on grades from interacting with other high scoring
students. There is mixed evidence that better peer groups translate into better labor market
outcomes through college quality (measured by average SAT score or selectivity). Dale and
Krueger (2002, 2014) and Mountjoy and Hickman (2020) find no returns to selectivity after
controlling for the set of colleges students applied and had been accepted to.3 However,
Hoekstra (2009), Zimmerman (2014), Andrews et al. (2020), and Bleemer (2021) show
that academically marginal students have a higher return from attending more selective
colleges. Moreover, Chetty et al. (2020) find that more selective colleges give higher returns
to education even after controlling for the set of colleges the students applied to. They
estimate the causal effect (due to value-added) of earnings differences across colleges to be
around 80%.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of
education policies. Several papers have modeled and quantified the effect of policies on
school choice, inequality, or labor market returns (Fernandez and Rogerson 1996, Bénabou
3

Though Dale and Krueger (2014) do find returns to selectivity among disadvantaged students.
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2002, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011, Ionescu 2009, Ionescu and Simpson 2016, Krueger
and Ludwig 2016, Kotera and Seshadri 2017, Caucutt and Lochner 2017, Abbott et al.
2019, Colas et al. 2021). In particular, our paper complements the analysis of Abbott
et al. (2019), who study the effect of financial aid policies and intergenerational transfers on
welfare, Ionescu and Simpson (2016) and Lucca et al. (2018), who examine policy changes in
student loan limits on college enrollment and tuition, as well as Krueger and Ludwig (2016),
who analyze the optimal mix of tax and education subsidies and their impact on human
capital accumulation. Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the effectiveness
of education policies in an environment that takes into account endogenous changes in the
college market.4
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical
evidence on application and enrollment patterns among students transitioning from highschool to college, Section 2.3 describes our model of the college market, Section 2.4 presents
our calibration and estimation procedure, Section 2.5 and 2.6 discuss our results, Section
2.7 provides counterfactual policy analysis, and Section 2.8 concludes.

2.2. Empirical Evidence5
In this section we document the application and enrollment choices of high-school students
using the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS), a relatively new student-level
dataset that to our knowledge has not yet been used for this purpose. We show that the
income gaps in college enrollment identified in the previous literature persist, and that they
are mostly explained by differences in application rates. Additionally, we use our data to
show the importance of student enrollment decisions conditional on being admitted. At
this stage of the admissions process we find that low-income students are still less likely
to enroll in any four-year non-profit colleges, and if they do enroll they are less likely to
4

The response of colleges to changes in financial aid policy has been shown to be empirically relevant. For
example, Lucca et al. (2018) and Turner (2017) provide evidence that college tuition increases in response
to federal policies that increase financial aid.
5
This section summarizes the key empirical results of Chapter 1, which describes our student- and collegelevel data in more detail, and provides a more in-depth analysis of student application decisions. Note that
the figures and tables mentioned here are re-purposed from Chapter 1.
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attend their preferred college due to costs. These results suggest that even if we closed the
gap in applications, financial aid at colleges is generally not high enough to close the overall
enrollment gaps.

2.2.1. Student Enrollment and Applications
We first document the enrollment and application choices of students from different backgrounds in Figures 1 and 2.6 We see in Figure 1 that while enrollment is highly correlated
with a student’s SAT score, it is also correlated with parental income. For example, among
students in the top quartile of the SAT distribution, those in the bottom third of the income
distribution were more than twice as likely not to enroll in college as those in the top sixth
(an enrollment rate of 70% compared to 90%). Within the top SAT quartile, students from
the top sixth of the income distribution were also 10 percentage points more likely to attend
a Highly-selective college than students from the rest of the income distribution.7
In Figure 2, we see that the gaps in enrollment are mirrored by gaps in applications.
For example, students in the bottom third of the income distribution are more than twice
as likely not to apply to any college conditional on being in the top SAT quartile, and
are about 20 percentage points less likely to apply to any Highly-selective colleges. This
is consistent with the findings from the previous literature: conditional on ability (and
holding fixed admissions and enrollment conditional on being admitted),8 enrollment gaps
are mostly explained by the fact that low-income students do not apply in the first place.
Thus, in order to explain the observed college enrollment gaps, we must first understand
decisions at the application stage and the role of the subsequent steps in the admissions
process.
6

Note that the data and construction of our variables are described in detail in Section 1.2.
Throughout the rest of the Chapter, we refer to colleges as ‘Highly-selective’ if they are ranked as ‘most
competitive’ or ‘highly competitive’ by Barron’s Profile of American College (2015).
8
See Section 1.3 from Chapter 1 for a decomposition of the observed enrollment gaps due to differences
in (1) application rates, (2) admission rates, and (3) enrollment rates conditional on admission. Section 1.3
shows that differences in application rates and conditional enrollment rates are the most important factors
in accounting for the overall enrollment gap, while admissions play a small role.
7
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2.2.2. College Costs and Enrollment Conditional on Admission
Much of the literature on college applications and undermatching has argued that lowincome students choose not to apply to colleges that they would be qualified for because
they are uninformed about possible financial aid, and are therefore applying sub-optimally.9
Here, we explore another possibility: even if information were perfect, lower-income students
would still not apply as much because they anticipate that college costs are too high, or they
(correctly) do not expect to receive sufficient financial aid if admitted.10 One advantage
of the HSLS is that it allows us to study enrollment decisions after students have been
admitted in order to understand the role of costs in driving their choices.
In Table 8, we present statistics on admissions and enrollment for students of different
income groups who were accepted to at least one four-year non-profit college. We see that
despite the fact that many such students were accepted to their most preferred college
(among the colleges they said they most seriously considered), the high-income students
were more likely to actually enroll in a four-year non-profit college. They were also less
likely to state that they did not attend the most preferred college they were admitted to
due to costs. Moreover, we see that the group of students not attending their preferred
college due to costs are much less likely to attend a four-year non-profit college at all,
especially if low-income.
In Table 9 we see a similar pattern for students who were admitted to at least one
Highly-selective college. It is important to single out these colleges because they typically
provide very generous financial aid to low-income students, making them cost as much or
even less than lower ranked colleges despite having much higher graduation rates and levels
9

See, for example, Bettinger et al. (2012), Hoxby and Turner (2013), and Dynarski et al. (2018) for causal
evidence on the effect of information on increasing applications and enrollment
10
In addition to need-based financial aid which can to some extent be predicted by looking at college
websites, many selective colleges also have merit-based aid that depends on an evaluation of a student’s
application and thus cannot be predicted with certainty. While it is well known that colleges at the very top
like Harvard or Yale offer full tuition discounts to all low-income enrollees, other elite schools have separate
merit-based aid that is granted competitively and thus have higher net-tuition on average for their lowincome students. See the scatterplot in Figure 14, which shows a positive relationship between acceptance
rates and average net-tuition for low-income students at Highly-selective colleges.
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Table 8: Admissions and enrollment statistics for students accepted to at least one four-year
non-profit college.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

Admitted to preferred college

85.0%

87.0%

86.8%

87.4%

Attending four-year, non-profit

79.8%

86.4%

88.5%

91.6%

64.8%

67.7%

72.2%

77.2%

Enrolling in preferred college

93.5%

95.3%

95.6%

97.0%

Not enrolling in preferred college (due to cost)

55.4%

68.1%

70.0%

73.7%

Attending most preferred
college admitted to
Attending four-year, non-profit conditional on...

of spending per student.11 In the table we see that lower-income students are less likely
to enroll in such Highly-selective colleges, even after being admitted. One strength of our
data is that we can show that this is due costs rather than differences in preferences: when
interviewed, students were asked to identify which college they preferred among the set of
colleges accepted to if not for costs. As we can see from the bottom of Table 9, there were
no major differences in preference for the Highly-selective option across the income groups.
However, conditional on preferring a Highly-selective college and being admitted to one, we
find that low-income students were much less likely to choose to attend one.
This finding is in contrast to Hoxby and Avery (2013) who argue that if high-ability,
low-income students applied, they would receive enough financial aid in order to enroll. In
Figure 19, however, we show that even if we look at students with SAT scores above 1300
(as Hoxby and Avery do), low-income students are less likely to attend a Highly-selective
college despite being admitted to one and preferring one. These results help us rationalize
why we would see undermatching at the application stage: if students anticipate that there
is a good chance they will not be able to enroll even if admitted, it would not be worthwhile
11

See Table 1, which compares college-level statistics for Highly-selective and Non-selective colleges.
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to apply in the first place.12
Table 9: Admissions and enrollment statistics for students accepted to at least one Highlyselective college.
Parental Income Group
<35k

35-75k

75-115k

>115k

Admitted to preferred college

82.6%

77.9%

89.8%

86.3%

Attending Highly-selective

57.6%

65.4%

61.0%

67.2%

76.6%

73.4%

78.6%

82.8%

65.8%

73.3%

67.8%

71.1%

21.0%

17.5%

15.9%

11.3%

Attending most preferred
college admitted to
Preferred college admitted
to is Highly-selective
Not attending Highly-selective
conditional on prefering it*

* Note: When asked which college they most preferred among those admitted to (if not for costs),
these students identified a Highly-selective college.

To summarize, we find that gaps in college enrollment are due not just to differences
in application, but also to enrollment decisions conditional on being admitted once students know how much financial aid they will receive. Motivated by these facts, the next
section builds an equilibrium model of the college market with a realistic application and
admissions system to study how admissions and financial aid policies shape outcomes for
students across the income distribution. Importantly, our model allows students to make
enrollment decisions after being admitted, which is factored into student decision making
at the application stage. This creates a mechanism where expectations about admissions
and financial aid affect student application choices.
Our model is necessary for two reasons: the first is to create an environment that allows
us to test whether our theory that (correct) expectations about financial aid is sufficient
12
The marginal cost for a student of adding Highly-selective colleges to their portfolio are likely to be high:
they may need to retake the SAT, write college-specific supplemental essays, and pay additional application
fees.
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in explaining the observed college application gaps. The second is to serve as a laboratory
for evaluating counterfactual policies, while taking equilibrium effects into account. These
effects may be important as many interventions that have aimed to increase applications
have operated in partial equilibrium by only targeting a sample of students or focusing
on just one college. But what would be the effect on the overall college market if policies
related to the admissions process were adopted on a wider scale? We use our model to
study how counterfactual scenarios such as equalizing application rates or removing SAT
requirements would affect the college market as a whole.

2.3. Model
Overview. The economy is populated by a unit measure of heterogeneous individuals, two
colleges of different types, and a government. Individuals live for two periods: young and
old. Young students start life with parental transfer y and ability level ℓ, and decide whether
they want to work or invest in their human capital by attending college. If they decide to
attend college, they must choose a subset of colleges to apply to. Admissions, however, are
risky since colleges can only observe a noisy signal σ of the student’s true ability ℓ. We
assume that a students’ parental transfer is fully observable to colleges.13 Students with
a high enough realization of σ receive an offer of admission and a college-specific tuition
level that depends on y and σ. Once the uncertainty is resolved and students know their
admissions and financial aid status, they choose which college to enroll in. At any stage,
students may choose the outside option of working instead of going to college (for simplicity,
we do not separately consider two-year colleges).
Colleges maximize the value-added they provide to their students on the labor market,
denoted Γs , s ∈ {1, 2}. Value-added is taken as given by the students but determined endogenously by the colleges. A college’s value-added will depend on its average instructional
spending and the average ability of its student body. Each college competes by setting
13
In order to receive federal grants or loans students must complete the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA), which states students’ parental income and financial assets. The FAFSA is fully
observable by the colleges that the student applies to, and we find that 77% of students in the HSLS
complete it.
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different admission standards and tuition schedules. Note that there is only one college per
type, so competition occurs across types rather than within types. When colleges make an
offer of admission, they take into consideration that students may have received other offers
and decide not to enroll. This option value for students makes the choice of tuition depend
not only on college-specific characteristics, but also on the pricing and admissions policy of
the other college. Both colleges differ exogenously in their endowment income, efficiency,
costs, and tuition caps. We refer to the elite college with the high endowment as College
1, and the other as College 2. Finally, the government taxes the working population to
subsidize colleges and pay for grant programs that support low-income students.
Model timing. The timing of events in the first period is as follows:
1. Individuals choose either to apply to college or go straight to the labor market. Those
who apply must choose an application portfolio which includes either or both colleges.
2. Colleges receive applications and choose which students to accept by setting their
admission standards and tuition schedules.
3. Students make their attendance decision given the admission and financial-aid offers
received.
4. Individuals make their consumption and savings decisions.

2.3.1. Student Application and Enrollment Decisions
We proceed in chronological order by first introducing the problem of an applicant, then the
decision problem involving the acceptance and rejection of offers, and finally the problem
of an enrolled student. The problem of a worker comes last.
Student’s value from applying. A student who decides to apply must choose either to
send one application to College s ∈ {1, 2}, or apply to both. If a student applies they draw
a realization of σ, which is a noisy signal of their ability ℓ and is unknown to the student at
the time of their application decision. The signals are drawn from a continuous conditional
density g(σ|ℓ) with cdf G(σ|ℓ) and support [0, ∞]. For simplicity, only one signal is drawn
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regardless of the application portfolio, so that both colleges observe the same signal.14
Taking the admissions standard σ s as given, a student is admitted to College s if σ ≥ σ s .
In the rest of the section, we focus (without loss of generality) on the case where College 1
is at least as selective as College 2 (i.e. σ 1 ≥ σ 2 ).15
Applications are costly, and include a financial cost as well as a ‘psychic’ disutility cost
meant to capture the effort of completing the applications.16 We denote the disutility by
ϕa , a ∈ {1, 2, B}, so that it depends on whether the student applies to College 1, 2, or
both. For simplicity, we assume that the financial application cost does not depend on the
application portfolio, and denote it by ψ. We include both types of costs since financial
application costs alone are not enough to account for the observed application rates.17
Let V AB (y, ℓ) be the expected value from applying to both colleges, and V As (y, ℓ) the
expected value from applying to College s only, s ∈ {1, 2}. The expected value of applying
to both colleges is given by

V

AB

Z

∞

(y, ℓ) =

V OB (y, ℓ, T 1 (y, σ), T 2 (y, σ))g(σ|ℓ)dσ

σ1

Z

σ1

+

V O2 (y, ℓ, T 2 (y, σ))g(σ|ℓ)dσ + G(σ 2 |ℓ)V W (y, ℓ, 1) − ϕB , (2.1)

σ2

where V OB (y, ℓ, T 1 (y, σ), T 2 (y, σ)) is the value of a student with both offers of admission
in hand, each priced at T 1 (y, σ) and T 2 (y, σ) for College 1 and College 2 respectively.
V O2 (y, ℓ, T 2 (y, σ)) is the value of a student with only College 2’s offer of admission who was
rejected by College 1, and V W (y, ℓ, 1) is the value of a worker (the “1” in the value function
denotes that the student will still pay the financial application cost).
14

This assumption, while made for tractability, is also supported empirically. We find that in the HSLS,
97% of students who were admitted to a highly-selective college (as defined in Section 1.2) were also admitted
to a non-selective college conditional on having applied to both.
15
While it is possible for College 2 to have a higher admissions standard in equilibrium, we confirm that
this is not the case in our baseline estimation and subsequent analysis.
16
This cost includes the effort and lost time associated with writing essays and filling application forms,
preparing for and taking the SAT (perhaps multiple times), or the time spent researching which colleges are
worth applying to.
17
In our estimation, we calculate the financial costs directly from the data so we can separately identify
the non-pecuniary disutility costs.
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The expected value from applying only to College s is given by

V

As

Z

∞

(y, ℓ) =

V Os (y, ℓ, T s (y, σ))g(σ|ℓ)dσ + G(σ s |ℓ)V W (y, ℓ, 1) − ϕs ,

(2.2)

σs

where V Os (y, ℓ, T s (y, σ)) is the value of a student who only applied to College s and was
admitted at price T s (y, σ).

Optimal application. The optimal application decision for a student with characteristics
(y, ℓ) solves the following simple discrete choice problem:


max V A1 (y, ℓ), V A2 (y, ℓ), V AB (y, ℓ), V W (y, ℓ, 0) .

(2.3)

Student’s value with offers of admission. After the signal is realized and students
know their admissions and financial-aid status, they decide which offer, if any, to accept. We
assume that admitted students draw idiosyncratic preference shocks ϵs over their available
alternatives. These shocks are mean zero Type I extreme value shocks with scale parameter
λc > 0. Including these shocks simplifies the analytical tractability of the model because
they allow for closed form solutions of the students’ enrollment functions, which are taken as
given by the colleges. The shocks can be interpreted as allowing the students to change their
mind about their college preference before enrolling for idiosyncratic reasons (e.g. campus
visits, or seeing how their friends enroll).
The value of a student with both offers of admission in hand is the expected value from
choosing between accepting College 1’s offer, College 2’s offer, or working,

V

OB

1

2

(y, ℓ, T (y, σ), T (y, σ)) =

Z


max V C1 (y, ℓ, T 1 (y, σ)) + ϵ1 ,

(2.4)

V C2 (y, ℓ, T 2 (y, σ)) + ϵ2 , V W (y, ℓ, 1) + ϵ3 dGϵ ,
where V Cs (y, ℓ, T s (y, σ)) is the value of attending College s and paying tuition T s (y, σ).
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The value of a student with only one offer of admission in hand is the expected value from
choosing the maximum value between accepting College s’s offer and working, i.e.

V

Os

Z

s

(y, ℓ, T (y, σ)) =


max V Cs (y, ℓ, T s (y, σ)) + ϵs , V W (y, ℓ, 1) + ϵ3 dGϵ , (2.5)

for s = {1, 2}. Given the extreme value shocks, the value functions simplify to

V OB (y, ℓ, T 1 (y, σ), T 2 (y, σ)) =


1
λc V C1 (y,ℓ,T 1 (y,σ))
λc V C2 (y,ℓ,T 2 (y,σ))
λc V W (y,ℓ,1)
log e
+ e
+e
λc

V

Os

s

(y, ℓ, T (y, σ)) =



1
λc V Cs (y,ℓ,T s (y,σ))
λc V W (y,ℓ,1)
log e
+e
λc

(2.6)

(2.7)

Optimal acceptance. With the Type I extreme value shocks over the students’ options
conditional on offers of admission, we can solve for the probability that a student with
characteristics (y, ℓ), signal σ, and application strategy i ∈ {A1, A2, AB} accepts the offer
of College s given tuition levels and admissions thresholds. Given admissions thresholds
σ 1 , σ 2 , the probabilities are given by

qis (y, ℓ, σ, T 1 , T 2 ) =



exp{λc V Cs (y,ℓ,T s )}


P

Cj
exp{λ
V
(y,ℓ,T j )}+exp{λc V W (y,ℓ,1)}

c


j







1


1+exp{λc [V W (y,ℓ,1)−V Cs (y,ℓ,T s )]}







if i = AB, σ ≥ σ 1
if i = As, σ ≥ σ s ,

(2.8)

or i = AB, σ 1 ≥ σ ≥ σ 2 ,
s=2

Note that the acceptance probability depends on both tuition levels only if a student chose
to apply to both colleges and was admitted to both. Students who applied only to one
college, or applied to both and were rejected by College 1 will therefore not have an outside
option of attending a different college.
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Student’s value from attending college. Once students have accepted an offer of
admission from a particular college, they face a two period consumption-savings problem.
The first period corresponds to four years of college and the next period corresponds to the
rest of their life. In the college period, the student must finance their consumption, tuition
payment, and application costs using parental transfers, grants, and student debt. Students
may borrow up to a limit denoted by as .18 Grants depend on the student’s income and are
separated into grants from outside sources, denoted Gr(y), and grants that are paid for by
the government, denoted P (y). Outside grants are exogenous in the model and are meant
to capture private scholarships or limited public scholarships. Grants from the government
are paid for by taxes in the model, and are meant to capture the federal Pell Grant program.
After graduating college and moving to the next period, the student enters the labor
market and receives a wage wo net of taxes τ per unit of human capital acquired in college.
The resulting human capital is given by Γs ℓαs , which depends on the college’s value added,
Γs , and parameter αs < 1 that governs the returns to ability. The student also pays her
loans back priced at the interest rate R, and discounts the future with discount factor β.
Finally, the student has preferences over consumption given by u(c), and incurs an additional
utility cost for attending College s, captured by ν s (ℓ). Including this extra ‘psychic’ cost
component is motivated by Cunha et al. (2005) and Heckman et al. (2006), who find that
such costs are necessary to explain observed college enrollment levels since pecuniary returns
alone would predict higher enrollment. We allow this term to vary by ability as we expect
the non-pecuniary costs of completing college to be lower for high-ability students.
18

This borrowing limit is motivated by the existing limits to federal student loans imposed by the Department of Education. Consistent with the federal limit, the modeled borrowing limit does not depend on the
student’s earnings potential.
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The value of an individual enrolled in College s, paying tuition T s , is then given by
V Cs (y, ℓ, T s ) = max
u(c) − ν s (ℓ) + βu(c′ )
′ ′
c,c ,a

s.t.

(2.9)

c + a′ = y − T s − ψ + Gr(y) + P (y)
c′ = R a′ + (1 − τ )wo Γs ℓαs
a′ ≥ as

′

Denote by as (y, ℓ, T s ) the student’s borrowing or savings policy function if studying at
College s. The student’s optimal consumption-savings decision is then governed by the
usual Euler equation
′

u1 (cs ) ≥ βR u1 (cs ),

(2.10)

where cs (y, ℓ, T s ) is the student’s consumption. Note that there is a maximum tuition level
the student can afford, which is given by

Tmax (y) = y − as − ψ + Gr(y) + P (y).

(2.11)

Therefore, any tuition level T s (y, σ) ≥ Tmax (y) is automatically rejected by a student with
parental transfers y, regardless of the value drawn for σ.

Value from working. Individuals end up as workers either by choosing not to apply, being
rejected, or by choosing not to attend college conditional on an offer of admission. The income of an individual working without a college degree is (1−τ )wℓαw , where αw < αs reflects
that higher ability individuals have a higher return from attending college. V W (y, ℓ, n) is
the value of an individual with parental transfers y and ability ℓ who submitted n ∈ {0, 1, 2}
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college applications:
V W (y, ℓ, n) = max
u(c) + βu(c′ )
′ ′
c,c ,a

s.t.

(2.12)

c + a′ = y + (1 − τ )wy ℓαw − ψ1{n>0}
c′ = R a′ + (1 − τ )wo ℓαw .
a′ ≥ aw

2.3.2. Colleges
There are two colleges who compete for students by setting their tuition schedules and
admission standard taking as given the tuition schedules, admission standard, and valueadded of the other college. The choices of one college affects the other through the student
enrollment function defined in (2.8). An equilibrium in the college market will then be a
fixed point in the set of possible college policies: the optimal choice of each college will be
consistent with the optimal choice of the other college.
The objective of each college is to maximize its value-added, which is given by

Γs ≡ ξs Q(Iµ , Lµ ).

(2.13)

ξs is the efficiency with which quality is transformed into value-added and Q(Iµ , Lµ ) denotes
the college’s quality, which depends on the average amount of instructional spending per
student Iµ and the average ability of the student body Lµ . The dependence of college
quality on Lµ accounts for peer effects, where students benefit more from the college when
its student body has a higher average ability. We also assume that Q is strictly increasing
and differentiable, with QLµ > 0 for Lµ > 0, QIµ > 0 for Iµ > 0.
In setting their tuition schedules, colleges may offer different prices to students of different
types. We assume that y is perfectly observable by the colleges, but that ℓ is unobserv-
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able. Instead, colleges can only observe the signal σ of ability described in Section 2.3.1.
Colleges thus face a signal extraction problem: they set their tuition and admissions policy
to influence the distribution of their student body, which is determined through Bayesian
updating. We assume that colleges know the distribution of initial student characteristics
(denoted by µ), the conditional signal distribution function, and the application decisions
for students of each type (which are determined in equilibrium according to 2.3). Taking
these objects as given, the colleges set their tuition schedules and the admissions standard
while taking into account how their choices affect the final distribution of the student body.
To calculate the distribution of characteristics in each college, it is helpful to first define
the total probability a student with characteristics (y, ℓ) will enroll in College s. Let pi (y, ℓ)
denote the probability that such a student chooses application strategy i ∈ {AB, A1, A2}.
The total probability is then:
s
q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T s , T −s (y, σ)) = qAB
(y, ℓ, σ, T s , T −s (y, σ))pAB (y, ℓ)

(2.14)

s
+ qAs
(y, ℓ, σ, T s )pAs (y, ℓ),

where qis (y, ℓ, σ, T s , T −s ) is given in Equation (2.8). Note that q̃ s depends on the tuition
schedule T −s (y, σ) of the other college if the student was accepted to both colleges, revealing
the nature of competition between both colleges.
Having defined the total probability of enrollment for a student of type (y, ℓ), we can
easily calculate the total enrollment, average ability of the student body, and the total
tuition revenue for each college. Integrating over all student types and acceptable signals,
the total enrollment and average student ability in College s are given by
Z

∞Z

κ =

q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T s (y, σ), T −s (y, σ)) g(σ|ℓ) dµ(y, ℓ) dσ

(2.15)

σs

Lµ =

1
κ

Z

∞Z

ℓ q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T s (y, σ), T −s (y, σ)) g(σ|ℓ) dµ(y, ℓ) dσ.

σs
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(2.16)

Similarly, total tuition revenue is given by

T

s

Z

∞Z

=

T s (y, σ) q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T s (y, σ), T −s (y, σ)) g(σ|ℓ) dµ(y, ℓ) dσ.

(2.17)

σs

Colleges balance their budget. Their revenue is derived from their own exogenous endowment income E s , government subsidies or appropriations T rs (which may depend on
the fraction of students enrolled, κ), and the total amount of tuition paid by students,
T s . In addition to total instructional spending, κs Iµ , the college faces operating expenses
C s (κ), increasing in the college’s enrollment level. For instance, these operating expenses
could relate to administrative or maintenance costs that do not increase the value-added
to students in the labor market, but are covered by the tuition students pay. The budget
constraint of College s is thus given by

κIµ + C s (κ) = E s (κ) + T rs (κ) + T s .

(2.18)

College’s problem. College s then solves the following problem:

max

σ s ,T s (y,σ),κ,Iµ ,Lµ

s.t.

T s (y, σ) ≤ T̄ s , σ s ≥ 0

ξs Q(Iµ , Lµ )

and

(2.19)

(2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18).

Note that the problem of College s depends on the tuition and admissions standard
chosen by the other college due to the dependence of q̃ s on the policies of both colleges.
Finally, note that we have introduced an upper bound on tuition for each college. We
introduce these tuition caps for two reasons. The first is to improve the empirical properties
of the model. A well known feature of the higher education market is that colleges post a
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sticker price tuition level, which a certain fraction of the student body pays.19 This means
that colleges are limited in how much they are able to extract from students with the highest
willingness to pay.
The second reason is that this constraint on tuition also induces a non-trivial choice for
σ s . Without limits on tuition, colleges can simply charge the low-signal students enough
to compensate for the decrease in average student ability they cause. Thus colleges would
not need to use an admissions threshold and would simply set σ s = 0. When tuition is
bounded, however, students with low signals who are willing to pay T̄ s will not be able to
compensate the college for lowering its average ability. The college would therefore find it
optimal to screen these students out by raising its admissions threshold σ s .

Optimal tuition. An interior solution for the optimal tuition level applied to students
with observable characteristics (y, σ) and positive probability of being accepted (σ ≥ σ s ) is
given by
 s


E
q̃
y,
ℓ,
T
(y,
σ)
|y,
σ
T s (y, σ) = Iµ + C (κ) − E (κ) − T r (κ) +


s
(y,σ))
{z
}
|
E −∂ q̃∂T(y,ℓ,T
|y, σ
s (y,σ)
Marginal resource cost
{z
}
|
s′

s′

s′

(Posterior) markup

−

QLµ
(E[ℓ|y, σ] − Lµ )
QIµ
|
{z
}

∀ y, σ ≥ σ s .

(2.20)

(Posterior) ability discount

The equation is derived in Appendix A.2.4. It is found by combining the first order conditions for the college-level aggregates κ, Iµ , Lµ , with the first order condition for the tuition
charged to a student with income y and signal σ ≥ σ s .
The optimal tuition level can be broken down into three components. First, tuition
must cover the marginal resource cost incurred by the college for enrolling an additional
19

We rule out the possibility of admissions being influenced by donations for students at the very top of
the income distribution.
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student. Note that this cost is common to all students and does not depend on y or σ.
Second, since the college has market power, the tuition level also takes into account the
student’s willingness to enroll in the college conditional on being admitted. This introduces
the familiar markup over marginal cost, which will be increasing in y since colleges will
capture the higher willingness to pay among higher income students. Note that since the
enrollment probability depends on the unobservable ℓ, colleges will also need to consider
the distribution of possible ℓ values informed by the observable σ and y.
Third, since the college values a higher average ability among its students, there is a
discount for students who have a higher (posterior) average ability than the overall average
ability of the student body (and a penalty for students with a lower average ability).20 Since
colleges cannot observe ℓ directly, they use the posterior mean of the distribution of ℓ that
is obtained after observing the student’s signal σ and parental transfer y. The posterior
distribution of ℓ is given by:

f (ℓ|y, σ) = R

∂ q̃ s
∂T s (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, ℓ)
.
∂ q̃ s
∂T s (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)

(2.21)

Since higher ability levels yield higher average signals through the signal density, the (posterior) ability discount will be increasing in σ. Importantly, the distribution also depends on
parental transfers through q̃ s , as defined in (2.14). This allows the equilibrium application
choices of the students to affect the tuition they are offered. For example, suppose that
at a given income level only high-ability students apply. Since colleges take the student
application decisions as given, they recognize that applicants from such an income level are
more likely to be higher ability and will therefore offer them higher levels of financial-aid.
This mechanism, which is new to our model, helps explain why low-income students receive
high levels of financial-aid, since we find that only the highest ability among them apply.
20

The difference between the marginal resource cost and the discount due to ability is commonly called
the effective marginal cost in the literature, meant to capture that the price accounts for the peer-externality
caused by a student with an ability different than the average. See and Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple
et al. (2006).
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Optimal admission standard. Lastly, the optimal admissions standard (given the policies of the other College) satisfies the following inequality for each College s:

R

T s (y, σ s )q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
R
≥ Iµ + C ′ (κ) − E ′ (κ) − T r′ (κ)
q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
R

QLµ
ℓ q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
R
− Lµ ,
−
QIµ
q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)

(2.22)

where q̃ s (σ s ) = q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ s , T (y, σ s )). The first order condition in (2.22) holds with equality
when σ s > 0, and its derivation is provided in Appendix A.2.4. Equation (2.22) can be
interpreted to mean that the average tuition revenue received from the lowest-signal students
must be enough to compensate the College for the resource cost they impose, and the change
they bring to the average ability.
Note, however, that the College’s tuition policy in Equation (2.20) guarantees that it
will be compensated for admitting the lowest-signal students since tuition depends on both
σ and y. Thus, without any constraints on tuition, a College will not choose an interior
value for σ s . Proposition 1 below formalizes this by demonstrating that when there are no
caps on tuition, (2.22) will never hold with equality since the College will be able to charge
the lowest-signal students enough to compensate for the change they bring to the average
ability of the student body.
Proposition 1. Suppose T̄ s is large enough so that the constraint T s (y, σ) ≤ T̄ s never
binds. Then σ s = 0. That is, if there are no tuition caps, the college does not exclude
students using an admissions threshold.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4

When there is a binding tuition cap, however, students with very low-signals will not be
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able to compensate the College for lowering its average ability. The College will then have
to raise its admissions standard to exclude these students. This can be seen by examining
(2.22). A low enough tuition cap will lower the left hand side by decreasing tuition revenue.
Once the left hand side is sufficiently small, the College will need to increase σ s to lower
the right hand side and achieve equality. Increasing σ s lowers the right hand side because
it raises the average ability of the College’s lowest-signal students,

R
Rℓ q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y,ℓ) .
q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y,ℓ)

2.3.3. Government
The government taxes labor income and uses the revenue to finance Pell Grants and college
subsidies. The tax base is composed of all workers who did not attend college (including
those who applied and those who did not) in both periods, and college educated workers in
the second period. The intertemporal government budget constraint must hold according
to

X

s

Z

s

∞Z

T r (κ ) +



s

P (y)q̃ g(σ|ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)dσ =
σs

s

"
τ w (1 + R

−1

Z

αw

)

ℓ

w

q̃ (y, ℓ) dµ(y, ℓ) + R

−1

X
s

Z

∞Z

#
αs s

ℓ q̃ g(σ|ℓ) dµ(y, ℓ) ,(2.23)

Γs
σs

where q̃ w is the total probability of not attending college:

w

q̃ (y, ℓ) = 1 −

XZ
s

∞

q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T (y, σ))g(σ|ℓ)dσ.

(2.24)

σs

2.3.4. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the college market consists of value functions for applicants V Aj , students
with offers of admission V Oj , enrolled students V Cj , and workers V W for j = {1, 2, B},
′

′

policy functions {d, as , cs , aw , cw }, probabilities q̃ s , q̃ w , admissions standards σ s and tuition
schedules T s : R+ × R+ → (−∞, T̄ s ], college choices {κs , Iµs , Lsµ , Γs } for s = {1, 2}, and tax
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rate τ , such that
′

′

1. Given {τ, Γs }, {V Cs , as , cs } solves (2.9) for s ∈ {1, 2}, and {V W , aw , cw } solves (2.12).
2. Given {V Cs , V W } and T s for s ∈ {1, 2}, V Oj satisfy (2.6)-(2.7) for j ∈ {1, 2, B}.
3. Given V Oj and {T s , σ s } for s ∈ {1, 2}, V Aj solve the problem of the applicant in
(2.1)-(2.2) for j ∈ {1, 2, B}.
4. d : R+ × R+ → {W, AB, A1, A2} is the application choice which solves (2.3).
5. q̃ s , q̃ w are, respectively, the total probabilities of ending up at College s and ending
up as a worker:

s
q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T (y, σ)) = qAB
(y, ℓ, σ, T s (y, σ))1{d(y,ℓ)=AB}
s
+ qAs
(y, ℓ, σ, T (y, σ))1{d(y,ℓ)=As}
XZ ∞
w
q̃ s (y, ℓ, σ, T (y, σ))g(σ|ℓ)dσ.
q̃ (y, ℓ) = 1 −
s

σs

where qis , i ∈ {AB, As} is defined in (2.8).
6. Given q̃ s for s ∈ {1, 2}, {κs , Iµs , Lsµ , Γs , T s , σ s }s∈{1,2} is a solution to the the College
game presented in Section 2.3.2. That is, for each College s ∈ {1, 2}, given the tuition
schedule, admissions threshold and value added of the other college, {κs , Iµs , Lsµ , T s , σ s }
is a solution to (2.19), and
Γs = ξs Q(Iµs , Lsµ ).

7. The government balances its budget according to equation (2.23).

Equilibrium Selection
The presence of peer effects introduces the potential for multiple equilibria. We follow Epple
et al. (2006) and Epple et al. (2017) in focusing on an equilibrium where the ranking of
college quality corresponds to the ranking of the endowment size. In our baseline equilibrium
and subsequent analyses, College 1 will then have the higher value-added and attract the
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higher-ability students. This is consistent with its higher endowment which allows for
higher amounts of spending per student. It is beyond the scope of our paper to show that an
equilibrium under this refinement is unique. However, we note that our numerical procedure
used to calculate the equilibrium converges consistently for different initial guesses, and is
robust to small changes in the parameter space.
Appendix A.2.10 provides details on how the equilibrium of the college market is solved
numerically.

2.4. Estimation
We are able to choose a subset of the model parameters directly from the data and the literature. The remaining parameters are estimated using the simulated method of moments.
Table 10 summarizes the parameters chosen outside the model, while Table 12 summarizes
the resulting estimated parameters.

2.4.1. Data
We rely on three main datasets to estimate our model: the High School Longitudinal Study
of 2009 (HSLS), the 2012 cohort of Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study
(BPS), and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).
The HSLS consists of a nationally representative sample of high-school students who are
tracked over time as they transition from high-school to college. A detailed description of
this dataset is provided in Section 1.2. We use the HSLS to calculate key moments regarding
student application and enrollment rates which we then match in our estimation procedure.
We also use the HSLS to estimate the parameters governing the distribution of students
characteristics.
The BPS is a longitudinal dataset provided by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) which follows a representative cohort of students over time starting with their
first year of undergraduate studies. The data include details of all financial-aid received by
the students who began college in the 2011-2012 academic year (close to our HSLS cohort
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who began college in the fall of 2013). This rich information about enrollment, tuition,
and financial-aid supplements the HSLS which has only self reported financial-aid data that
is not broken down by source (private institutional aid vs. government grants). We use
the BPS to set the level of non-institutional grants available to students, and to determine
how grants and financial-aid vary with SAT scores and parental income. We also use it to
determine the college tuition caps.
IPEDS is a public college-level database managed by the NCES. It is established from a
series of mandatory surveys of all U.S. colleges who participate in federal student financialaid programs. IPEDS is helpful for estimating the college side of our model because it contains rich information on college-level financial variables. The data contain details about
college revenue from all sources including tuition, government appropriation, and endowment income. The data also report and categorize all college costs and expenses. We provide
details about how we construct our sample of colleges from IPEDS in Appendix A.2.1.

2.4.2. Students’ attributes
We start by describing our choices for the parameters that govern the student’s problem.
A list of these parameters and their values are given in Table 10.
Preferences. Individuals have logarithmic preferences over consumption each period:

u(c) = log(c)

In our two period model, we consider the first period to account for 4 years (time in college),
and the second period to account for 60 years (time spent working). In order to pick the
appropriate values for {β, R, w}, we show in Appendix A.2.5 how a life-cycle model with
T + 1 periods maps into our two period model, where we take T = 15. In the life-cycle
model, we set β = (1/R)4 . Mapped into our two-period model, this gives us the values
β̃ = 5.48 that correspond to the problem presented in (2.9).
In order to simplify the computation of the equilibrium, we add a set of Type I extreme
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Table 10: Externally set parameters
Variable

Description

Value

Source

Returns to education
αs

Returns to ability (college)

0.78

Abbott et al. (2019)

αw

Returns to ability (no college)

0.55

Abbott et al. (2019)

Aggregate prices and borrowing constraint
as

Student borrowing limit

-0.775

USDE

R

Gross interest rate

1.0386

USDE

w

Wage

2.7

CPS

Budget Parameters
ψ

Financial application cost

0.00375

g0

Intercept of grant function

0.43

BPS

g1

Slope of grant function

0.19

BPS

Pmax

Pell Grant maximum

IPEDS

0.5645

USDE

College Parameters
os0

Fixed costs

[0.15, 0.25]

IPEDS

os2

Quadratic costs

[5.77, 0.43]

IPEDS

Es

Endowment income

[0.12, 0.06]

IPEDS

T r1s

Gov transfers per student

[1.00, 0.62]

IPEDS

T̄ s

Tuition Cap

[2.50, 1.20]

BPS

value shocks to the discrete choice problem in (2.3). With the shocks, the problem becomes


max V A1 (y, ℓ) + ϵ1A , V A2 (y, ℓ) + ϵ2A , V AB (y, ℓ) + ϵ3A , V W (y, ℓ, 0) + ϵ4A .

(2.25)

where we let ϵA ∼ Gumbel( λ1a ). The shocks simplify the equilibrium computation since
they smooth the application probabilities taken as given by the Colleges when setting tuition. The shocks allow these probabilities to respond continuously to changes in the tuition
schedule in each iteration, which simplifies the convergence of the solution algorithm described in Appendix A.2.10. Since the shocks are used only to simplify the computation,
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we pick λa to be large in order to minimize their variance. We set λa = 40. Note that
these shocks are included in addition to the shocks that occur after the application stage,
when the students make their enrollment decisions. We include the scale parameter for the
second-stage shocks in our method of moments estimation, described in more detail below.
Finally, we assume that the college specific non-pecuniary costs of completing college
are given by the linear function
ν s (ℓ) = ν0s − ν1s ℓ,

(2.26)

where the parameters {ν01 , ν11 , ν02 , ν12 } are included in the joint method of moments estimation
below.
Aggregate Prices. We choose w = 2.7, so that the model produces the average wage
calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We set R = (1.0386)4 since annual
borrowing rates for undergraduate students was 3.86% in 2013-2014 academic year. This
rate was set by the US Department of Education (USDE) through the Federal Student Loan
Program. Again, note that we need to adjust these life-cycle level values to fit into our two
period model using Appendix A.2.5.
Distribution of characteristics. We take the distributions of student characteristics, i.e.
(y, ℓ), from the HSLS. Since the model deals directly with the level of parental transfers
the students receive, we abstract from a theory of parental transfers and therefore do not
use parental income from the data directly. Instead we use the student’s Expected Family
Contribution (EFC), which is determined according to rules set by the Department of
Education using the FAFSA filled out by the students and their parents. EFC is a measure
of the amount of resources a student reasonably has available to them in order to attend
college (before financial aid), and so maps well into our notion of parental transfers used in
the model.
In the HSLS, we are able to observe the EFC for all students who completed the FAFSA
and attended college, and we calculate it for those who did not using the household income

65

reported by their parents in the survey. Our direct calculation uses the EFC formula established by the Department of Education, and is described in detail in Appendix A.2.2. We
provide the details of how we use the HSLS to fit the distribution of student characteristics
(y, ℓ) in Appendix A.2.2. Finally, note that since students in the HSLS began college in
the 2013-2014 academic year, we use 2013 dollars as our numeraire and re-scale by $40,000.
Note that the first period in the model corresponds to four years. Thus, for example, y = 1
in the model corresponds to an EFC of $10,000 per year over four years.
Signal distribution. We assume that signals follow a normal distribution conditional on
ability, with mean ℓ, and variance σg2 . We also assume that the distribution is truncated
below at 0, so that the lower bound of the support of the signals is finite. We include the
variance σg2 as part of the joint parameter estimation below.
Financial application costs. The application process involves two types of costs: a nonpecuniary cost and a financial cost. We find in the HSLS that students send about three
applications on average, and from IPEDS that the average application cost is $50. This
total cost corresponds to a value of ψ = 0.00375 in the model. Note that for simplicity,
the financial cost of applying is the same regardless of whether students send one or two
applications. The marginal cost of sending an additional application in the model is instead
captured by the non-pecuniary costs provided that ϕB > max{ϕ1 , ϕ2 }. Since the financial
cost includes only the direct resource cost of applying to college, all other indirect costs are
captured by the application disutility costs.
Returns to ability and education. We take the parameters governing the labor market
returns to ability αs , αw directly from Abbott et al. (2019). They find that for college
graduates, the ability gradient is 0.797 for males and 0.766 for females. For high school
graduates they find the gradients to be 0.517 and 0.601 for males and females respectively.
Hence we simply set αs = 0.78 for graduates of both colleges and set αw = 0.55. The labor
market returns for attending the more selective college are then captured only by differences
in Γ1 and Γ2 .
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Borrowing constraints. According to the Federal Student Loan Program, the aggregate
limit for dependent students who are completing an undergraduate degree is $31,000 in federal loans. We therefore set the student borrowing limit to as = −0.775, which corresponds
to $31,000 over four years.
Grants and Aid. We consider two types of grants available to students who attend college
and allow these to vary by the student’s level of parental transfer. The first are grants that
are exogenous in the model, denoted Gr(y), which stand in for unmodeled state grants or
private grants and scholarships. We assume they take the following form:

Gr(y) = max{g0 − g1 y, g}.

(2.27)

Using the BPS, we pick g = 0.15 and estimate g0 = 0.43, g1 = 0.19. The details are provided
in Appendix A.2.2.
Pell Grant amounts are set according to the Department of Education. In order to
qualify, students must demonstrate sufficient financial need as measured by the difference
between their EFC and the Net Cost of Attendance (tuition plus room and board minus
institutional financial aid). The Pell Grant makes up this difference, up to a maximum
level. In the model, we have

P (y) = max{Pmax − y, 0},

(2.28)

so that Pell grants effectively give all low-income students a minimum level of transfers. In
2013 the maximum Pell Grant amount was $5,645 per year, so we set Pmax = 0.5645. We
later study the effects of changes to this parameter in the policy section of the paper.

2.4.3. Colleges’ attributes
College Types. To separate both types of colleges in the model, we rely on Barron’s 2015
rankings of U.S. colleges. This ranking is commonly used in the literature as a measure
of college quality. We consider College 1 to be Barron’s Tier 1 and 2 schools (“elite”
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Table 11: Empirical differences across college types
College Type

1

2

Number of Colleges

182

1,621

Undergraduate Enrollment

17%

83%

Fraction Public

53%

75%

Average SAT Score

1297

1056

Rejection Rate

57%

32%

Instructional Expenditures per Student (US$)

22,468

8,846

Average Tuition and Fees (US$)

26,327

12,077

Net Cost for Bottom 20% Income (US$)

8,750

9,646

Median earnings 10 Years After Entry (US$)

58,706

41,906

Endowment Assets per Student (US$)

141,838

12,332

Note: Statistics reported are enrollment-weighted averages. All averages were calculated using
IPEDS and College Scorecard data.

and “highly selective”), and College 2 to be all other four-year colleges and universities
(excluding for-profit colleges). Table 11 summarizes key empirical differences across these
college types using our sample of colleges from IPEDS.
Table 11 shows that the differences between each college type are consistent with the
model’s predictions. The top colleges enroll a smaller share of the total student population,
have higher expenditure per student, higher SAT scores, higher average tuition, while still
offering low tuition to students at the bottom of the income distribution. The Barron’s
ranking thus leads to a natural partition between colleges that we use for our quantitative
analysis. Note that while the top colleges are more likely to be private, as a group their
overall enrollment mostly consists of students in public colleges. Therefore, unmodeled
institutional differences between public and private schools are unlikely to play a big role in
explaining differences between the two types since both groups have a similar composition
of students within each type.
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Technology. Colleges’ quality is defined by

Q(Iµ , Lµ ) = Iµ1−ρL LρµL ,

where ρL is included as part of our internal estimation below.
Cost function and government transfers. We follow Epple et al. (2017) and assume
college operating costs are a quadratic polynomial in their total enrollment,

C s (κ) = os0 + os1 κ + os2 κ2 .

(2.29)

We set the linear cost os1 = 0, and estimate the fixed cost and quadratic cost terms using
our sample of colleges from the IPEDS data. We find (o12 , o22 ) = (5.77, 0.44), and (o10 , o20 ) =
(0.15, 0.25). The details of our estimation are provided in Appendix A.2.2.
Government spending on public universities (which account for the majority of enrollment in both types of colleges) accounts for a large share of college funding. We assume
that the government subsidizes colleges on a per-student basis:

T rs (κ) = T r1s κ.

Similar to the cost function estimation, we estimate this relationship using our IPEDS
sample. We find (T r11 , T r12 ) = (1.0, 0.62). See Appendix A.2.2 for details.
Endowment income. We assume that private endowment income at the colleges has a
component that depends on enrollment (private donations that are restricted to be used on
scholarships per student enrolled), and a fixed component:

E s (κ) = E0s + E1s κ.

(2.30)

We make this distinction for endowment income because the enrollment levels for each
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college are determined largely by the net fixed costs: os0 − E0s .21 Enrollment will then be
determined by the fraction of the endowment used to offset the fixed costs, and the fraction
used to offset per-student costs. This is important for College 1 where the endowment
is large, so we estimate E11 to match the observed enrollment in College 1 (discussed in
the estimation procedure below). For College 2, we find that we are unable to match the
observed enrollment given our estimate of o20 even if we assume that E02 = 0. We thus leave
the enrollment at College 2 as an un-matched target and simply assume that E02 = 0.
Finally, to find the remaining endowment parameters, we use our IPEDS sample to
calculate the total level of private endowment income received by each college by adding
up all private revenue the college received over our 2013-2016 sample period. This includes unrestricted revenue the college may use from gifts, investment return from their
endowment, or contributions from affiliates. We find the total endowment incomes to be
E 1 = 0.12, E 2 = 0.06. Thus for College 1, we set E01 = 0.12 − E11 κ1 (using our SMM
estimate for E11 ), and for College 2 we have E12 = 0.06/κ2 (where κ1 , κ2 are the enrollment
levels observed in the HSLS).
Tuition caps. To find the tuition caps T̄ s we rely on the BPS data, which include details
about all financial-aid received by each student. We note that in the data, the average level
of tuition minus college-specific financial-aid becomes flat in Expected Family Contribution
(EFC) for high-EFC students. This fact, illustrated in Figure 21 reflects that high-income
students generally do not receive financial-aid, as institutional grants are more likely to be
given to low-income students. In the model, the caps on tuition bind for students with the
highest parental transfers. We therefore pick T̄ 1 = 2.5, T̄ 2 = 1.2, which correspond to the
average upper bound on tuition paid by high-income students within each college in the
data (see Figure 21).
Value added. Colleges’ efficiency parameter ξs is chosen to match the college wage pre21

Since colleges only care about per student variables, they have an incentive to keep their enrollment
levels as small as the net fixed costs permit.
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mium in the data. Abbott et al. (2019) estimate an average college wage premium of 0.6.
Since 17% of students are enrolled in selective colleges, we have that the average wage
premium is such that
0.17 log Γ1 + 0.83 log Γ2 = 0.6.

To find the dispersion between Γ1 , Γ2 , we rely on estimates by Chetty et al. (2020)
who report that 80% of the difference in median log earnings 10 years after college can be
explained by differences in colleges’ selectivity. Using the numbers from Table 11, we have

log Γ1 − log Γ2 = 0.113.

This gives us Γ1 = 2.01, Γ2 = 1.79. We fix these corresponding values for Γs in the baseline
estimation below, and find ξs such that the resulting value for Iµs , Lsµ are consistent with
the corresponding Γs values.

2.4.4. Method of moments estimation

We estimate the remaining parameters Θ = ϕ1 , ϕ2 , ϕB , λc , ν01 , ν02 , ν11 , ν12 , E11 , ρL , σg2 jointly
by minimizing an unweighted quadratic (percent) distance criterion function between data
moments and simulated model moments. The results of the estimation are presented in
Table 12, and a description of the data moments is provided in Table 13. The details of the
estimation procedure are presented in Section A.2.3.
Application disutility costs. To help identify the application disutility costs, ϕ1 , ϕ2 , ϕB ,
we match the fraction of students applying to each college type only, and the fraction of
those applying to both. In the HSLS, we observe that 2% apply only to College 1, 42%
apply only to College 2, and 14% apply to both. Note that we find the estimated College
1 application cost to be lower than the College 2 application cost. This reflects that in
the model it is very risky only to apply to College 1, so a relatively low application cost is
necessary match the correct fraction of students who would choose only to apply there.
To assess the magnitude of these costs, we calculate the equivalent consumption a stu71

Table 12: Parameters estimated jointly by SMM
Variable

Description

Value

ϕ1

Application cost (College 1)

0.100

ϕ2

Application cost (College 2)

0.185

ϕB

Application cost (both)

0.320

ν01

College 1 psych cost (intercept)

2.410

ν02

College 2 psych cost (intercept)

1.700

ν11

College 1 psych cost (slope)

-1.467

ν12

College 2 psych cost (slope)

-0.758

λc

Extreme value scale parameter

1.855

E11

College 1 endowment

1.371

ρL

Quality parameter

0.854

σg2

Variance of signal

0.110

Preference

Technology

dent would forgo in order to remove the disutility cost. In Table 14 we report the average
consumption equivalent values as a percentage of average life-cycle consumption for all students. We see that our estimates are considerably higher than those found in the literature,
but note that this is largely due to high marginal utility of consumption among high-income
students and those who choose not to enroll. If we restrict only to lower-income college enrollees who have lower consumption due to credit constraints, we see that their application
disutility costs are substantially lower.
College preference parameters. We introduced a ‘psychic’ disutility cost of college in
(2.9), which we allow to vary by college and assume depends linearly on ability:

ν s (ℓ) = ν0s − ν1s ℓ.
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Table 13: Moments matched in estimation
Moment

Model

Data

% Applying to College 1

2.03

2.00

% Applying to College 2

46.1

42.0

% Applying to both

15.1

14.0

College 1 rel app rate (SAT quintile 5/4)

3.43

3.33

College 2 rel app rate (SAT quintile 4/2)

1.63

1.55

College 2 attnd rate (1 app)

0.79

0.83

College 1 attnd rate (accepted both)

0.55

0.58

College 2 attnd rate (2 app)

0.94

0.90

% Enrolled College 1

7.15

7.00

∆ Tuition wrt SAT

-0.08

-0.08

College 1 accpt rate

0.69

0.70

Parameters estimated jointly using SMM. All moments were calculated using the HSLS, except the
change in tuition with respect to SAT, which is calculated using the BPS. “College 1 rel app rate
(SAT quintile 5/4)” refers to the relative application rates to selective colleges between students in
the 5th vs 4th SAT quintile. For example, students in the 5th quintile are about 3.33 times more
likely to apply to a College 1 than students in the 4th SAT quintile. “College 2 rel app rate (SAT
quintile 4/2)” is defined similary. “College 2 attnd rate (2 app)” refers to the College 2 attendance
rates for students who applied to both types and were only admitted to College 2. “∆ Tuition wrt
SAT” is determined by regressing net-tuition on SAT in our BPS data (controlling for EFC and
college-fixed effects).

Matching student enrollment decisions conditional on being accepted helps us identify the
intercept parameters, while variation in student applications across the SAT distribution
help us identify the slopes. In Table 12 we find that while the intercept ν0s term is higher in
College 1, the slope term is more negative. This reveals substantial differences in preferences
for each college across the ability distribution. College 1 will be less costly than College 2
for high-ability students while the reverse is true for low-ability students.
To get a sense of the magnitude for these psychic costs of schooling, we again calculate
consumption equivalent amounts for each student and report them as a percentage of average
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Table 14: Application costs expressed as a percentage of average life-cycle consumption
Overall
average

Enrollee average
(Bottom 50% income)

Fu (2014)

Apply College 1

0.78%

0.52%

0.30%

Apply College 2

1.19%

0.58%

0.34%

Apply Both

1.87%

0.89%

0.45%

Average application disutility costs among the student population expressed as a percentage of
average life-cycle consumption (calculated in the model to be about $900,000). The application
costs calculated in Fu (2014) are provided for reference to the literature. The costs from Fu (2014)
are calculated assuming two applications for College 1, three for College 2, and six for both (which
we observed among average applicants in the HSLS).

Table 15: Non-pecuniary college completion costs expressed as a percentage of average
life-cycle consumption
Avg psychic
cost, ν s (ℓ)
College 1

1.23%

College 2

2.76%

Among enrollees

1.86%

Abbott et al.
(2019)
10.7%
4.6%

Average non-pecuniary ‘psychic’ costs expressed as a percentage of average life-cycle consumption
(calculated in the model to be about $900,000). The costs calculated in Abbott et al. (2019) are
provided for reference to the literature.

life-cycle consumption in Table 15. Even when adding in the application costs from Table
14 we see that these non-pecuniary costs are substantially smaller than those estimated in
Abbott et al. (2019). The reason we find such small costs for the overall population is that
our model accounts for the fact that many students have a low chance of being admitted,
so a relatively small cost is sufficient to exclude them from the college market. Thus our
model can help rationalize the relatively high psychic costs of schooling typically found in
the literature: many students choose not to enroll not because of preferences, but because
they are unlikely to be admitted and therefore do not apply in the first place.
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Finally, λc is the scale parameter for the extreme value shock introduced in (2.4)-(2.5)
that is realized after a student receives offers from either college. Unlike the shocks that
were added to the application choice, these shocks are meaningful because they encourage
students to apply more aggressively by increasing the option value of having another college
to choose from (compare 2.6 with 2.7). Therefore, if λc is low then a large fraction of students
applying only to College 2 will be unlikely to enroll since their applications were motivated
more by the increased option value rather than the value-added from attending College 2.
Thus, variation in attendance rates at College 2 (conditional on being admitted and only
sending one application) created by variation in λc helps us identify the parameter.
College quality and signal strength. The ability-related parameter ρL in the colleges’
quality function and the variance of the signal σg2 are chosen to help the model match the
average responsiveness of tuition with respect to ability, and the average acceptance rate
to College 1 conditional on applying. As discussed in Section 2.3, the (posterior) ability
discount depends on the strength of the signal, so that the average responsiveness of tuition
to the signal is sensitive to the choice of the variance. In the BPS, we estimate this effect by
regressing tuition minus institutional grants on SAT score, controlling for EFC and college
fixed effects. Similarly, matching the average conditional acceptance rate for College 1 helps
us identify ρL because we find that a higher value for this parameter increases the size of
the ability discount, which increases the attractiveness of applying to College 1. All else
equal, this will tend to reduce acceptance rates due to the increase in applications with
little change to the enrollment level.
Endowment and Fixed Costs. Lastly, the fixed cost each college faces is an important
variable for determining its enrollment level. As mentioned above, colleges care about per
student variables, so they will remain as small as their fixed costs allows them to be. Thus,
variation in the fixed component of a college’s endowment, E0 in (2.30), will have an effect
on its overall enrollment level. We find that this is particularly important for College 1,
who has a high total endowment income relative to its estimated fixed cost. We then
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estimate E11 to match the College 1 enrollment level observed in the data, and back out
the corresponding value for E01 from the observed total endowment income calculated from
IPEDS. For College 2, we find that the empirical enrollment level is too large to be explained
only by its endowment. We thus leave its enrollment level to be an un-targeted moment.

2.5. Results
2.5.1. Model Fit
College Level Statistics. Table 16 below compares college level statistics produced by the
model to ones we calculate in the data. We find that the model somewhat underestimates
the average EFC within each college, though it captures the fact that EFC in College 1 is
about twice as high as in College 2. To compare average student ability in the model and
in the data, we report the average SAT and average application signal within each college
(since they are both noisy signals of true ability). To put the two measures in similar
units, we report the standardized values (where we standardize the signal according to the
distribution of applicants). As we see in the second row of the table, the model does a good
job of allocating relatively high signal students into College 1, and students with average
signals into College 2.
Finally, the model is able to capture the large difference in instructional spending per
student across each college. The amount spent per student in College 1 is large due to
its higher tuition levels and large endowment. The model is also able to capture the fact
that spending per student is significantly higher than average tuition revenue per student,
which reflects how government subsidies and endowment income are used to cover remaining
college expenses. Note, however, that average net tuition at each college is slightly higher
in the model compared to the data.
Student Distribution Within Colleges. Importantly, the model is able to deliver student income distributions within each college that are consistent with the data. Table 16
shows the distribution of parental transfers (EFC in the data) within in each college. We
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Table 16: Model fit, college level statistics
College 1

College 2

Model

Data

Model

Data

% Enrolled

7.15

7.00

32.09

36.0

Average Student EFC∗

2.22

3.04

1.14

1.55

Average Applicant Signal/SAT

1.45

1.12

0.29

0.05

Instr Spending per Student∗

2.10

2.25

0.98

0.89

Average Net Tuition∗

1.60

1.41

0.61

0.50

Q1 Income

9.8%

9.6%

22.1%

23.4%

Q2 Income

11.6%

12.1%

20.5%

16.4%

Q3 Income

26.4%

23.1%

30.6%

28.1%

Q4 Income

52.2%

55.2%

26.8%

32.2%

Income Distribution

Collegel level statistics in the model and data (all untargeted except College 1 enrollment). Income
refers to parental transfers in the model, and Expected Family Contribution (EFC) in the data. The
average signal (in the model) and SAT score (in the data) among applicants are standardized for
comparison. Average Net Tuition here refers to the sticker price minus college-specific financial aid,
and does not include outside grants. ∗ $10k/yr.
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see that in both colleges the EFC distribution is well accounted for, especially in College 1
where the model very closely captures the correct share of low-income students. Normally in
this type of college-market model, colleges have a strong incentive to enroll mostly students
from the top of the income distribution since they pay higher tuition, and are generally
higher ability since income and ability are correlated. Epple et al. (2017), for example,
over-predict the share of high-income students, and argue that unmodeled social objectives
like affirmative action may help explain the gap in low-income student enrollment.
In our model, the application and admissions system helps us capture the correct share
of low- and high- income students at selective colleges without making any additional assumptions about social objectives. This happens for two reasons. The first is that since
colleges cannot observe ability perfectly, they will limit the size of the ability-based tuition
discounts they would otherwise offer. Thus, in order to match the sensitivity of tuition to
SAT observed in the data, we require a relatively large value for ρL , the parameter which
governs a college’s willingness to substitute average instructional spending for a higher average ability. This provides the colleges with a smaller motive to raise revenue and instead
enroll higher ability students, many of which are lower-income and would otherwise be
excluded. The second reason is due to selection effects arising from the application and
admissions system. Since low-income students are less likely to apply to the more selective college, the ones who do apply are very high-ability in equilibrium. Thus the selective
college can be confident that enrolling low-income students will help increase its average
ability, and it will give large tuition discounts to the low-income students it enrolls. This
selection effect due to the application choices of low-income students is explored further in
the next section.
Tuition Variation. In Figure 6, we plot the average net-tuition in the model and in the
data for students grouped by EFC decile within each college. In the data, net-tuition is
defined as sticker-price tuition minus all grants available to the student. In the model, we
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Figure 6: Average net-tuition in the model and data

Average Net Tuition
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College 1 (data)
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Expected Family Contribution (EFC) Decile

Average net-tuition (sticker-price tuition minus all grants) for students by Expected Family Contribution decile. Source for data: 2012 cohort of Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal
Study.

then set net-tuition for a student with parental transfers y and signal σ as follows:

N etT uition(y, σ) = T (y, σ) − P (y) − Gr(y).

Due to the presence of the tuition caps we have imposed, the model is generally able to
capture the tuition for students at the very top of the EFC distribution, especially in College
2. The model is also successful at predicting both the level and change in net-tuition across
the parental income distribution, but somewhat overestimates the tuition for low-income
students. One reason net-tuition for low-income students is high relative to the data is that
nearly all students in the model borrow the full amount of student loans available to them,
allowing the colleges to charge relatively high tuition. Students borrow the full amount
because they have high second period earnings and there is no income risk, so they try to
equalize consumption across both periods.
Student Application and Enrollment Patterns. The model is able to account for the
low application and enrollment rates observed for low-income students despite the presence
of substantial financial aid described above. Figure 7 shows the model predicted average
application and enrollment rates alongside the ones observed in the HSLS data for students
grouped by Expected Family Contribution (EFC) decile. We see that the model correctly
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Figure 7: Model fit, student application and enrollment
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The left panel displays the average application rates for students by Expected Family Contribution
(EFC) decile, and the right panel displays the average enrollment rates to each college. In the left
panel, we include only applications to College 2 or applications to both since the fraction of students
only applying to College 1 is small both in the model and the data. Empirical application and
enrollment rates are calculated using the High School Longitudinal Study (HSLS).

predicts that applications to the more selective college are increasing in EFC (we do not
report the fraction only applying to College 1 since it is small). Note that the model
overestimates the application rates for students at the very top of the EFC distribution.
The right panel in Figure 7 shows the model predicted enrollment rates and the ones
observed in our data for students grouped by EFC decile. We find that the model does a
good job of capturing the increasing patterns in enrollment for students at both colleges,
though the model underestimates the enrollment at the top for College 2. Note that for each
plot the overall means of the application rates and College 1 enrollment rates are targeted
in the baseline estimation, but the variation in applications by EFC and the enrollment
rates in College 2 are not targeted.

2.5.2. Equilibrium Effect of Applications on Low-Income Student Enrollment
This section studies the importance of the admissions system in shaping college outcomes
for low-income students. As discussed before, an important mechanism in the model that
accounts for merit-based financial aid at each college is the equilibrium informativeness of
students’ signals due to their application decisions. If, for example, only the highest ability
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among the low-income students apply in equilibrium, the colleges will increase their financial
aid since they will be more confident that the low-income applicants are high ability.
To illustrate this mechanism, Figure 8 shows what happens to high-ability student enrollment when all low-income students apply in the same way as their higher-income peers.
Specifically, we adjust the application rates from the baseline equilibrium by requiring that
low-income students apply to both colleges at the same rate as the highest-income students.
We then recompute the equilibrium, holding fixed these new application pools (thus this
is a partial-equilibrium analysis since student application behavior remains fixed). Note,
however, that we still allow tuition, admissions policies, and student enrollment behavior to
adjust. This exercise helps isolate the effect of student application portfolios on the overall
allocation of students.
Figure 8: Effect of closing application gap conditional on ability

1.0
0.8

Enrollment Rates (Top 10% Ability Students)
College 1, Baseline
College 1, More Applicants
College 2, Baseline
College 2, More Applicants

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0 0

2
4
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

6

Average enrollment rates for students in the top 10% of the ability distribution by parental transfers.
The plot shows the effect on enrollment of switching to an equilibrium where low-income students
apply to both colleges at the same rates as high-income students conditional on ability.

Since only the highest ability low-income students applied in the baseline equilibrium,
closing the application gap substantially increases the application rates of relatively lowability, low-income students. As we see in Figure 8, introducing new low-ability applicants
to the low-income applicant pool reduces the enrollment of the high-ability, low-income
students in College 1 by about a quarter. This occurs because the signals colleges will
receive from any low-income student are now much more likely to come from one of the
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new low-ability applicants. Since this reduces the likelihood that low-income students will
improve the average ability of the student body, colleges will then lower the financial aid
they offer all low-income applicants. As we can see from the figure, this effective increase
in tuition significantly reduces their enrollment at College 1. It is also important to note
that since College 1 is now unable to enroll as many high-ability students, its value-added
will decline due to a lower average ability in its student body. A summary of the overall
changes to the college market in the new equilibrium is provided in Table 20.
Overall, this section highlights an important insight of the model: the composition of
college application pools affects the informativeness of the signals and hence the colleges’
tuition levels. This helps resolve the “puzzle” of low application rates from low-income
students despite the presence of high financial aid. Through the lens of the model, lowincome students receive high financial aid precisely because they are less likely to apply.
Thus, policies aimed at increasing applications that are not targeted by ability will be
harmful to low-income, high-ability students who would otherwise benefit from having their
signal be more informative.

2.6. The Role of Application Informativeness
In this section we study the general equilibrium effects of changes to the signal variance.
In our first counterfactual exercise we examine the effect of increasing the signal variance,
motivated by concerns over the use of the SAT. In our second exercise, we study the effect of
switching to perfectly informative signals by removing admissions uncertainty for students
and allowing colleges to fully observe student ability.

2.6.1. Ending the SAT
What would happen if the application signals were to become less informative? This question is motivated by the fact that many colleges waived SAT or ACT requirements during
the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, the use of standardized tests for college admissions has
recently come under scrutiny as the University of California system has begun phasing out
their reliance on the SAT for admissions. If we consider the use of the SAT as part of the
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technology that increases the informativeness of the signals, we can model the removal of
these tests by making the signals less informative. To study the effects of less informative
signals, we increase the variance of the signal by a factor of six from the baseline estimation
and recompute the equilibrium. We choose this value for the signal increase because we find
that it minimizes average welfare in comparison to the baseline equilibrium.22 Through the
lens of our model, this experiment can then be interpreted as an upper bound for the losses
caused from removing the SAT.
Table 21 shows the effect of increasing the signal variance on college-level variables. In
the new equilibrium the higher variance leads to poorer sorting based on ability, which
causes the average student ability to drop in both colleges. Less informative signals also
reduce the marginal cost of admitting lower signal students, since their signals are now
more likely to have come from higher ability applicants. Thus, we see increases in the
fraction of students enrolled and decreases in the admissions standards. While there is
little change to the income distribution within each college, the ability distribution has
become more diffuse, reflecting the increased admissions probability for low-ability students
and decreased admissions probability for high-ability students. Finally, while the colleges
endogenously increase their spending per-student it is not enough to offset the decreases in
average ability, leading to lower value-added at both colleges.
To see which students are affected by the decrease in the informativeness of the signals,
Figure 9 plots the percent of consumption in each period different types of students would
be willing to forgo in order to be born in the new equilibrium. Note that for reference,
we have also plotted the changes to student enrollment resulting from the new equilibrium
in Figure 23. As expected, the high ability students are the ones who are most hurt from
switching to the new equilibrium since the higher variance decreases their likelihood of being
admitted to the colleges at the expense of the lower ability students. Importantly this effect
is strongest for the low-income, highest-ability students because College 1 now offers lower
22

Figure 22 in the appendix plots the change in welfare for a range of possible increases in the signal
variance.
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levels of financial aid to the highest signal students.
Figure 9: Welfare effects of less informative signals

Equivalent % Change in Per-Period Consumption
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Percent of lifetime consumption students of different parental-income and ability groups are willing
to give up in order to switch to the equilibrium with less informative signals.

The students who benefit from this change are the high-income, low-ability students, who
can now more easily be admitted to the colleges. As can be seen from the solid line in Figure
9 and from Figure 23, students at very bottom of the ability distribution with high parental
transfers benefit from less informative signals because they can now more easily enroll in
College 2. Similarly, the highest-income students in the 30-60% ability range also benefit
from being able to more easily sort into College 1, while the lower-income students in the
30-60% ability range benefit from more easily sorting into College 2. Finally, we find very
little change in welfare for low-ability, low-income students because gains they experience
from the increased chance of being admitted are offset by decreases in the financial aid they
can expect to receive.

Effect when signals are correlated with income.
One concern over the use of the SAT is that low-income students tend to score lower than
high-income students, suggesting that the SAT is not as informative about low-income
student ability. As a robustness check, we take this consideration into account by allowing
the removal of the SAT to decrease the signal informativeness at the top of the parental
transfer distribution more than the bottom. This captures the idea that such a policy would
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not be as harmful to lower-income students.
In a new experiment, we then set the factor increase in the signal variance to grow
linearly in the student’s parental transfer, with the lowest-income students experiencing
their signal variance increase by a factor of 2 and the highest-income students by a factor
of 6. The effect of the new experiment is presented in Table 22, and the welfare effects are
presented in Figure 24. We see that the detrimental effect on value-added from making the
signals less informative is still present, causing welfare losses for all high-ability students
that are significantly larger than the modest gains among the low-ability students. Due
to the income differences in the variance increase, however, the high-income high-ability
students are now the ones who are made worse off by the change.

2.6.2. Perfectly Informative Signals
To further study the effects of the information frictions due to the application and admissions
system, we now set the signal to be perfectly informative so that the colleges may observe
the student’s true ability (i.e. g(σ|ℓ) = 1 for σ = ℓ). In this exercise, colleges set their
tuition and admissions standards based on ability instead of the signal, and students know
ex-ante whether they will be admitted and exactly how much financial aid they will receive.
We then compare this perfect information equilibrium to the baseline equilibrium.
The effect of the new equilibrium on each college is shown in Table 23. If signals are
perfectly informative, the effective marginal cost of enrolling a high-ability student decreases
substantially because colleges can perfectly tell them apart. This will lower tuition for highability students and raise the average ability within the student body, thereby increasing
the effective marginal cost for relatively low-ability students. As the effective marginal cost
of enrolling high-income, low-ability students rises, colleges will increase their admissions
threshold to exclude them since the tuition cap is not high enough to justify admitting
them. The higher average ability makes it more costly to admit lower ability students,
leading to an overall decrease in enrollment. Additionally, this decrease in the effective
marginal cost for the new high-ability enrollees lowers tuition revenue, which decreases the
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average instructional spending per student. However, the increase in average student ability
is more than enough to offset the decreases in per-student spending, leading to increases in
value-added at both colleges.
The effect of perfectly observable signals on student enrollment at each college is shown
in Figure 10 below. We see that sorting based on ability is vastly improved in the new
equilibrium, with students at the bottom of the ability distribution substantially reducing
their enrollment. There is a large drop in students enrolling in College 2 from the 30-60%
ability group who are replaced by low- and middle-income students from the 60-90% ability
group. Finally, College 1 is now able to enroll students almost exclusively from the top 10%
of the ability distribution, mostly to the benefit of high-income students who no longer have
to compete with lower-ability applicants.
Figure 10: Effect of perfect information on student enrollment
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Average enrollment rates for students by parental transfers in the baseline equilibrium and perfect
information equilibrium.

Perhaps surprisingly, perfect information actually reduces the enrollment of high-ability,
low-income students in College 1. This seems puzzling at first because tuition decreases at
College 1 for high-ability students as they can now be perfectly sorted. The reason for the
decrease in College 1 enrollment is that College 2 now lowers its tuition enough to incentivize
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many low-income, high-ability students to switch. In the baseline, College 2 could not
offer high levels of financial aid because their pool of low-income applicants included many
low-ability students, making it hard to sort out the high-ability low-income students. With
perfect information, the high-ability low-income students cannot be mistaken for low-ability
applicants, allowing College 2 to increase their financial aid and attract them away from
College 1.
To understand the strength of college competition under perfect information, Figure 11
shows College 1 enrollment for students in the top 10% of the ability distribution in a partial
equilibrium world where uncertainty disappears for students, but tuition and admissions
policies remain the same (the dotted line). In this scenario, the high-ability, low-income
students enroll in College 1 at higher rates since they know they will be admitted at low
tuition levels. However, when both colleges adjust their policies in response to signals
becoming perfectly informative, the low-income students prefer to attend College 2 where
tuition is even lower.
Figure 11: Effect of perfect information on high-ability student enrollment

College 1 Enrollment Rate (Top 10% Ability)

1.0

Baseline
Partial Effect
Total Effect

0.8
0.6
0.4
0

2
4
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

6

Average College 1 enrollment rate by parental transfers for students in the top 10% of the ability
distribution. The ‘Partial Effect’ shows how enrollment changes when students have perfect information, but tuition and admissions are the same as in the baseline. The ‘Total Effect’ shows the
perfect-information equilibrium where colleges adjust tuition and admissions.
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2.7. Policy Experiment: Increasing Pell Grants
Increasing the maximum level of Pell Grants was part of President Biden’s proposal for
higher education policy on the campaign trail. It is now being discussed more concretely as
part of the “American Families Plan”, which calls for the maximum to be raised to $7,895
per year. In this section, we study the effects of increasing the Pell Grant maximum to
$25,000 per year, which is equal to the tuition cap at College 1. Recall that in order to
qualify for a Pell Grant, a student’s Expected Family Contribution (EFC) must be lower
than their Net Cost of Attendance (tuition plus room and board minus financial aid). The
Pell Grant then covers this difference up to a maximum level. In the model, we simply set
the Pell Grant to be equal to the difference between the set maximum and the student’s
parental transfer (see 2.28). Note also that in our experiment, the higher Pell Grants are
paid for by tax increases, as implied by the government budget in Equation (2.23).
The effect of increasing the Pell Grant maximum on colleges can be seen in Table 24, and
the effects on student enrollment can be seen in Figure 25. In Table 24 we see a large effect
on the income distribution within College 1. By increasing the funding available for lowerincome students, the grants cause them to enroll in College 1 at higher rates while higherincome students enroll at lower rates, making the income distribution less concentrated at
the top. College 1 will then charge higher tuition to students with increased grant funding,
which leads to an overall increase in tuition revenue and instructional spending per student.
With costs no longer an issue for high-ability, low-income students, they enroll at higher
rates which increases the average ability of the student body. Note however, that this
increase is quantitatively modest, suggesting that the newly enrolled high-ability students
from lower income groups are not much higher ability on average than the high-income
students they replace.
Figure 25 illustrates the effect of the higher Pell Grants on student sorting, where enrollment is plotted against parental transfers for students at different parts of the ability
distribution. We see that for College 1, the enrollment profiles in parental income flatten
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considerably conditional on ability. This is especially important for high-income students
in the 60-90% group, who now enroll at College 1 at much lower rates. Interestingly, we
also see that there is a small increase in College 2 enrollment for low-income students in
the lowest ability group. As shown in Table 24, this has the effect of lowering the average
ability in College 2 enough to slightly lower its value-added.
Finally, we examine the welfare effects of the policy change. Figure 12 plots the percent
change in period consumption students of different income and ability groups would be
willing to forgo in order to switch to the equilibrium with higher Pell Grants. As expected,
we see that the students who benefit from the policy are the relatively low-income, collegegoing students. They benefit directly from the increased consumption while in college
(which also alleviates the effect of the credit constraint), and from more easily being able
to sort into the colleges. Higher-income students are made worse off from the policy due to
the higher taxes, and due to higher competition in enrollment with lower-income students
who can now attend more easily. Note that for students at the very bottom of the ability
distribution, the only change is the loss experienced from higher taxes since they enroll at
very low rates in either equilibrium. Overall, we find that average welfare change of the
policy in terms of per-period consumption equivalent units is 1.97%.

2.7.1. Decomposing the effect of the Pell Grant increase
In this subsection we examine the importance of different channels in our model for understanding the effectiveness of the policy change. First, to isolate the role of the college
market, we use our model to study the effect of the Pell Grant increase in the absence of
changes to tuition or admissions. Next, to isolate the effect of the admissions system we
examine how the change in the Pell Grants would affect students differently if there were no
admissions uncertainty. Finally, we study the importance of the tuition caps in driving our
results by considering how student allocations would change under the Pell Grant increase
if tuition caps increased as well.
College market. To decompose how changes in the college market influence the effect of
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Figure 12: Welfare effects of increase in Pell Grant maximum.
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Percent of lifetime consumption students of different EFC and ability are willing to give up to switch
to the equilibrium with the higher Pell Grant maximum.

the Pell Grant increase, we hold all college tuition and admission policies fixed and study
how student application and enrollment behavior change in response to the policy (allowing
taxes to correspondingly adjust). We find that in the absence of adjustments in the college
market, the higher Pell Grant funding increases total enrollment by 10% in sharp contrast
to the negligible effect on enrollment reported in Table 24. This increase is driven by
affected students who enroll at significantly higher rates without any change for students
unaffected by the Pell Grant increase. When tuition and admissions policies are allowed
to adjust however, they reflect competition among students over limited college size. After
the adjustment, we see that the increase in enrollment for affected students increases by
only 1.2%, while unaffected students see a 1.0% decrease in enrollment. Overall, we find
that without accounting for changes in the colleges market, student welfare would increase
by 5.2% in consumption equivalent units. Our model then implies that ignoring the effects
of changes in the college market would lead us to overestimate the welfare gains of the
financial-aid policy by more than a factor of two.
Admissions uncertainty. Next, we examine the role of the admissions system in shaping
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the effectiveness of the Pell Grant increase. To do so, we first remove all uncertainty by
making signals perfectly informative about student ability and then re-calibrate our model
to match all targets described in Table 12 (except the average admissions rate for selective
colleges). We then study the effect of the Pell Grant increase under the new calibration. We
find that under the new calibration with perfectly informative signals, the welfare increases
by 4.9% in consumption equivalent units, which is more than double the increase from the
baseline scenario. The noise from the admissions signal thus dampens the welfare gains from
the grant increase. This happens because affected students still have a chance that they will
draw a low signal and be unable to benefit from the grant, which leads to a lower ex-ante
welfare gain. For high-income students unaffected by the Pell Grant change, the welfare
losses are larger with signal uncertainty because the grants cause colleges to endogenously
increase their standards. This harms even high-ability, high-income students because there
is a greater chance they will not be admitted. If signals were perfectly informative, however,
the welfare losses would be concentrated only among the relatively low-ability, high-income
students who are replaced.
Another reason the welfare change from the policy is stronger under perfect information
is due to higher value-added at the colleges. In the new calibration the value for ρL is lower,
which means that the marginal effect of per-student spending on value-added is higher.
Increases in Pell Grants, which will increase per-student spending, will then have a stronger
effect on the colleges’ value-added. Overall, this exercise shows that failing to account for the
uncertainty associated with the admissions system would lead us to exaggerate the positive
welfare effects of federal financial aid policy. This is illustrated in Figure 26, which shows
welfare gains from possible increases to the Pell Grant maximum. We see that the optimal
increase in the Pell Grant maximum would be largely overstated in the perfect-information
calibration as opposed to our baseline.
Tuition caps. Finally, we explore the effect of the Pell Grant increase under different
scenarios where we also allow for changes in the tuition caps. This exercise is motivated by
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the unrealistic assumption that tuition caps would remain fixed in response to large increases
in federal financial aid. As a robustness check, we therefore re-run our policy as before but
also feed in 10% and 30% increases to the tuition caps to account for potential increases
in the sticker prices. The results are presented in Tables 25 and 26. We see that when the
tuition caps are higher, colleges respond to the Pell Grant increase by raising tuition even
more among affected students, which results in increased spending per-student and higher
value-added. Note that conditional on the Pell Grant increase, the higher tuition from the
increased tuition cap leads to lower enrollment as well. Next, we see that the adjusted
tuition caps lead to more concentration at the top of the income distribution at College 1.
This suggests that possible unmodeled increases in tuition caps that may result from the
policy will limit the extent that the financial aid will reduce income inequality at selective
colleges. Finally, we note that the welfare gains from the policy are not diminished with
higher tuition caps, as affected high-ability students would still benefit from the increased
financial aid.

2.8. Conclusion
This paper studies the role of the admissions system in shaping the allocation of students in
the college market. Using micro-level data on high-school students transitioning to college,
we showed that parental income is correlated with college applications and enrollment.
We found that higher-income students are more likely to apply to college not only at the
extensive margin, but also at the intensive margin by applying to more selective colleges.
Moreover, we provided suggestive evidence that applicants face risk not only in the college
admissions decision, but also in the financial aid decision as many students reported that
they were unable to attend their preferred college due to costs.
Motivated by our empirical findings, we then built an equilibrium model of the college
market with student heterogeneity and a non-trivial application and admissions system. We
found that our model is able to jointly reconcile the income differences in application and
enrollment rates on the student side of the market, and high levels financial aid available
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to low-income students on the college side of the market. Through the lens of our model,
we learned that lower-income students apply to selective colleges at lower rates because of
expectations that they will not receive sufficient financial-aid. Since a college education and
student ability are complementary, and since higher-ability students expect higher average
application signals, we found that only the highest-ability among the low-income students
apply to selective colleges. This makes the selective colleges confident that their low-income
applicants are of high ability, justifying the high levels of financial aid we observe.
In focusing on the role of applications, we have abstracted from many important issues
in the college market. By assuming there are only two colleges, we were unable to distinguish between public and private colleges. This is an important distinction since the
funding for state schools depends on state governments, and these schools are able to offer
substantially lower levels of tuition to in-state students. Adding two more colleges to allow
for this distinction would complicate the model, but would allow for more realistic competition on the college side of the market. We have also abstracted from the source of the
parental transfers. In reality, a parent’s willingness to invest in their children’s education
is conditional on the student’s decisions, and may be an important margin of adjustment
in response to policy. Finally, we have assumed that students are guaranteed to graduate
and can perfectly forecast their post-college earnings. In reality students face substantial
drop-out and post-college earnings risk, which may be important factors in determining a
student’s willingness to pursue a college education. We leave these considerations for future
research.
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APPENDIX

A.1. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1. Data Appendix
Barron’s Selectivity Index
List of Barron’s Tier 1 and 2 Colleges and Universities (Alphabetical)
Tier 1 (“most competitve”): Amherst College, Barnard College, Bates College, Boston
College, Bowdoin College, Brown University, Bryn Mawr College, Bucknell University, California Institute of Technology, Carleton College, Carnegie Mellon University, Case Western
Reserve University, Claremont McKenna College, Colby College, Colgate University, College
of Mount Saint Vincent, College of the Holy Cross, College of William & Mary, Colorado
College, Columbia University/City of New York, Connecticut College, Cooper Union for the
Advancement of Science and Art, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Davidson College, Duke University, Emory University, Franklin and Marshall College, George Washington University, Georgetown University, Georgia Institute of Technology, Hamilton College,
Hampshire College, Harvard University/Harvard College, Harvey Mudd College, Haverford College, Johns Hopkins University, Kenyon College, Lehigh University, Macalester
College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Middlebury College, New York University,
Northeastern University, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Ohio State University
at Marion, Pitzer College, Pomona College, Princeton University, Reed College, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Rice University, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, Santa Clara
University, Smith College, Southern Methodist University, Stanford University, Swarthmore
College, The Ohio State University, Tufts University, Tulane University, Union College,
United States Air Force Academy, United States Military Academy, United States Naval
Academy, University of California at Berkeley, University of California at Los Angeles,
University of Chicago, University of Miami, University of Missouri/Columbia, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania,
University of Richmond, University of Rochester, University of Southern California, Uni94

versity of Virginia, Vanderbilt University, Vassar College, Villanova University, Wake Forest
University, Washington and Lee University, Washington University in St. Louis, Webb Institute, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, Whitman College, Williams College, Yale
University

Tier 2 (“highly competitive”): Allegheny College, American University, Augustana College, Austin College, Babson College, Bard College, Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Baylor
University, Beloit College, Bennington College, Bentley University, Berea College, Berry
College, Binghamton University/The State University of New York, Boston University,
Brandeis University, Brigham Young University, California Polytechnic State University,
Centre College, Christian Brothers University, Clark University, Clarkson University, Clemson University, College of New Jersey, College of the Atlantic, Colorado School of Mines,
Cornell College, CUNY/City College, Denison University, Dickinson College, Drexel University, Elon University, Emerson College, Florida State University, Fordham University,
Furman University, Gettysburg College, Gonzaga University, Grinnell College, Grove City
College, Gustavus Adolphus College, Hendrix College, Hillsdale College, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Indiana University Bloomington, Ithaca College, Kalamazoo College, Kettering
University, Lafayette College, Lawrence University, Miami University, Mills College, Mount
Holyoke College, Muhlenberg College, New College of Florida, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, North Carolina State University, Pepperdine University, Polytechnic
Institute of New York University, Providence College, Purdue University/West Lafayette,
Rhodes College, Rollins College, Sarah Lawrence College, Sewanee: The University of the
South, Skidmore College, St. John’s College, Santa Fe, St. John’s College-Annapolis, St.
Lawrence University, St. Mary’s College of Maryland, St. Olaf College, State University of
New York / College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Stevens Institute of Technology,
Stony Brook University / State University of New York, SUNY College at Geneseo, Syracuse
University, Texas Christian University, Trinity College, Trinity University, Truman State
University, United States Coast Guard Academy, United States Merchant Marine Academy,
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University of California at Davis, University of California at Santa Barbara, University of
Connecticut, University of Florida, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, University of Maryland, University of Michigan/Ann Arbor, University of Minnesota/Twin Cities,
University of Pittsburgh at Pittsburgh, University of Puget Sound, University of San Diego,
University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas at Dallas, University of Tulsa, University of Wisconsin/Madison, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Westmont
College, Wheaton College, Wheaton College, Worcester Polytechnic Institute

High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09)
Figure 13: Distribution of total household income (2011) in the HSLS sample.
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Table 17: Summary statistics for HSLS sample.
Mean

Std. Deviation

Count

High-School GPA

2.71

(0.96)

15,738

SAT Score

974

(208)

12,007

(2.78)

9,608

Academic outcomes

% With SAT Scores

69.0%

% Applying to four-year non-profit

57.1%

Number of applications*

3.62

% Enrolling at 4-year non-profit

44.1%

% Enrolling at 2-year

24.2%

% Enrolling at for-profit

2.6%

Demographics
Household Income in 2011**

72,239

(56,229)

Parent’s Education
Less than high-school

9.9%

High school diploma or GED

44.5%

Associate’s Degree

15.9%

Bachelor’s Degree

20.0%

Master’s Degree or higher

9.6%

Race/Ethnicity
White

52.4%

Black

13.4%

Asian

3.5%

Hispanic

22.0%

Gender
Male

49.8%

Female

50.2%

High School Variables
High School is private

6.9%

Students receiving subsidized lunch

4.78%

15,456
(2.66)

14,811

Location
City/Suburb

59.2%

15,453

Rural/Town

40.8%

15,453

*Conditional on applying to any four-year non-profit colleges.
**Calculated using a categorical variable for total family income (<15k, 15-35k,. . . , 215-235k, >235k)
Note: All statistics are calculated from a sample of 15,764 students unless noted otherwise.
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Figure 14: Scatterplot of net-tuition for low-income students (income <$30k per year in
2013) and undergraduate acceptance rate
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Note: Net-tuition data are from the 2013-2014 academic year, and the acceptance rate was calculated
by averaging over both the 2012 and 2013 admission cycles. This sample of consists of all four-year,
non-profit Bachelor’s degree granting colleges available from IPEDS (excluding theological seminaries
and bible colleges). “Highly-selective” colleges correspond to those ranked as “most competitive”
and “highly competitive” by Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (2015), while “Non-selective”
corresponds to the remaining colleges in the sample. “Ivy+” corresponds to all Ivy League colleges
plus Stanford, MIT, Chicago, and Duke.
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Figure 15: College application and enrollment by parental income and student GPA
Enrollment Rates by Parental Income
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Application Rates by Parental Income
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Note: The “<35k” income group corresponds to the bottom third of the parental income distribution
in the HSLS, “35-75k” corresponds to the middle third, and “75-115k” and “>115k” evenly divide the
top third of the distribution. These groups were chosen to highlight that the gaps in applications and
enrollment by income are largely driven by students at the top of the distribution. “Highly-selective”
colleges correspond to those ranked as “most competitive” and “highly competitive” by Barron’s Profile of
American Colleges (2015), and “Non-selective” colleges corresponds to all remaining four-year non-profit
colleges and universities.
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Figure 16: Reasons student do not enroll in college, and decomposition of enrollment gaps
(GPA)
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The top panel of the figure shows the reasons students across the parental income do not attend
college even if they do apply. The bottom panel decomposes the extent to which the gap in college
attendance observed in the HSLS between students from the “>115k” group and lower income
groups is driven by differences in: (a) application rates, (b) admission rates, and (c) enrollment
rates (conditional on admission). The decomposition is described in Equation 1.1. The same figures
using students’ SAT instead of GPA is provided in Figure 3.
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Figure 17: Fraction of students not attending preferred college due to costs
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These figures show binned-scatter plots for the fraction of students who do not attend their preferred
college due to costs (among the set of colleges admitted to), and how this fraction varies by total
family income in 2011. The admission, enrollment, and income data are from the High School
Longitudinal Study, which surveyed students for the 2012-2013 enrollment cycle.
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Figure 18: Fraction of students not attending preferred college due to costs (if admitted to
a Highly-selective college)

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

Percent not attending preferred college due to cost

<15k

35-55k

75-95k
115-135k
135-175k
Total Family Income

195-215k

>235k

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

Percent not attending preferred college due to cost, SAT≥1300

<15k

35-55k

75-95k
115-135k
135-175k
Total Family Income

195-215k

>235k

These figures show binned-scatter plots which vary by family income for the fraction of students who
do not attend their preferred college due to costs (among the set colleges admitted to), conditional
on being accepted to at least one Highly-selective college. Highly-selective colleges and universities
are those considered “most competitive” or “highly competitive” by Barron’s Profile of American
Colleges (2015).
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Figure 19: Fraction of students not attending a Highly-selective despite preferring one and
being admitted to one

.05

.1

.15

.2

.25

.3

Percent not attending preferred college due to cost, SAT≥1300

<15k

35-55k

75-95k
115-135k
135-175k
Total Family Income

195-215k

>235k

Note: Preferred college is Highly-selective

.05

.1

.15

.2

.25

.3

Percent not attending Highly-selective even if admitted and prefer it

<15k

35-55k

75-95k
115-135k
135-175k
Total Family Income

195-215k

>235k

Note: Both figures condition on students who were admitted to at least one Highly-selective college.
The top panel conditions on students who scored at least 1300 on their SATs and noted that if not
for costs, the college they most preferred is Highly-selective. The bottom figure shows the fraction
of students not attending any Highly-selective college conditional on preferring one (if not for costs)
and being admitted to one.
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Figure 20: Predicted application probabilities by family income
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Predicted relationship between parental income and application decisions for different SAT scores
implied by estimated logit models. The values of all other covariates are held at their respective
means. The top figure corresponds to whether the student applied at all, the bottom figure corresponds to whether the student applied to any Highly-selective colleges (as defined in Section 1.2.2)
conditional on applying. See Table 6 for estimation results.
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A.2. Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1. IPEDS Sample Restrictions
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System is made publicly available through
the National Center for Education Statistics. Since we are interested only in four-year
nonprofit U.S. colleges and universities, we make the following restrictions to the universe
of colleges in the system:
• U.S. only; Title IV participating; Degree-granting
• Undergraduate enrollment at least 100
• No Theological/faith related institutions
• No 2 year colleges
• No for-profit colleges
We restrict our IPEDS data sample to cover the 2013-2016 time frame, since it is the relevant
4 year period for our HSLS cohort who begin college in 2013. Our final sample includes
1,665 four-year colleges and universities.

A.2.2. Estimation Appendix
EFC Calculation
For students who did not fill out the FAFSA, we calculate their EFC directly using the
2013-2014 EFC formula with data from the HSLS survey. To calculate EFC, one must
first calculate Adjusted Available Income (AAI), which combines household income net of
allowances (which depend on household size) and household assets (excluding the family’s
home). Since the HSLS does not report assets, we assume that the contribution from assets
is 0.
The parents’ contribution from AAI is then calculated from a (progressive) non-linear function of AAI, described in the table below:
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If parents’ AAI is –
Less than -$3,409
-$3,409 to $15,300
$15,301 to $19,200
$19,201 to $23,100
$23,101 to $27,000
$27,001 to $30,900
$30,901 or more

Parents’ contribution from AAI is –
-$750
22% of AAI
25% of AAI over $15,300 + $3,366
29% of AAI over $19,200 + $4,341
34% of AAI over $23,100 + $5,472
40% of AAI over $27,000 + $6,798
47% of AAI over $30,900 + $8,358

EFC is then the parents’ contribution divided by the number of children that are enrolled
in college. The HSLS specifies only if students have a sibling in college at the same time, so
to find EFC we divide the parents’ contribution by two if the student does have a sibling
in college. We are thus able to construct EFC for the students in our sample even if they
did not complete the FAFSA.

Distribution of Student Characteristics
In the HSLS, we find that approximately 30% of the students have an EFC of 0. In fitting
our distribution, we therefore assign a mass point of 30% for y = 0. For the remaining
70% of the distribution with y > 0, we assume that y follows a log-normal distribution,
y ∼ LogN (µy , σy2 ).
We use the students’ SAT score in the HSLS as a proxy for ability to determine the distribution of ℓ. Again, we assume that ℓ follows a log-normal distribution, ℓ ∼ LogN (µℓ , σℓ2 ).
Since y and ℓ are correlated, we estimate these parameters separately for the case where
y = 0 and where y > 0.
To summarize, the joint distribution of (y, ℓ) is given by:



2 )

(y = 0, ℓ) ∼ LogN ormal(µℓ0 , σℓ0



  


w.p. 30%


 µy   σy2


  
(y > 0, ℓ) ∼ LogN ormal 


  , 



µ
σ
ℓ1

yℓ

σyℓ 


σℓ2

w.p. 70%

2 = 0.155 for y = 0, and µ = 0.135, σ 2 = 0.138
Using the HSLS, we find µℓ0 = −0.144, σℓ0
ℓ1
ℓ1
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for y > 0. We also estimate µy = −0.301, σy2 = 2.825. Finally, to account for this correlation
for the case where y > 0, we estimate the covariance between ℓ and y to be σyℓ = 0.174.

Grant Function Estimation
Since all college-specific grants (both need-based and merit-based) and federal Pell Grants
are accounted for in our model, we add the exogenous grants, denoted by Gr(y), to stand
in for all other grants that students receive. We identify all such grants in our BPS data
by adding up all grants and aid excluding loans, Pell Grants, and institutional aid. As we
can see from the binned scatter-plot below, these grants vary substantially with Expected

1,000

2,000

Non-Pell Grants
3,000
4,000

5,000

Family Contribution (EFC).

20,000

-5,000

0

40,000
60,000
Expected Family Contribution

80,000

2,000

Non-Pell Grants
4,000
3,000

5,000

0

5,000
10,000
Expected Family Contribution

15,000

These grants are decreasing in EFC and tend to level off at around $15,000. For EFC below
this level, we estimate a downward sloping linear relationship between EFC and non-Pell
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Grants using OLS (and controlling for SAT score). We find g0 = 0.43, g1 = 0.19 in (2.27),
corresponding to right panel of the plot above. We pick g = 0.15 to capture that the grants
level off at a sufficiently high EFC level.

College Cost Function Estimation
Before estimating the college-specific parameters using our IPEDS sample, we first confirm
that the sample includes the relevant colleges relative to the HSLS. We compare the share
of total student enrollment accounted for by each type of college1 in our IPEDS sample
with the enrollment shares observed in the HSLS. For students in our HSLS sample, we find
the following fractions at each type of college:

κ1 = 0.069

κ2 = 0.357.

To confirm that these numbers are consistent with our IPEDS data, we first add up all
full-time equivalent undergraduate students across all colleges in our sample. We then infer
the total number of high school graduates using the 42% 4-year enrollment rate reported
by NCES.2 We find that of this population, 7% attend College 1 and 35% College 2, similar
to the HSLS enrollment patterns.
Confident that our IPEDS sample includes all colleges relevant for our analysis, we use
variation in enrollment size for colleges to estimate the parameters of the cost function
introduced in (2.29). We start by estimating the parameters in the following regression
separately for each type of college:

costsi = Ô0s + Ô2s (kis )2 + εi ,

(A.1)

for college i of college type s, where k is the enrollment level of college i. In order to
measure the costs for each college in our sample, we use the detailed financial data available from IPEDS. There are two methods to measure costs: one is by directly adding up
1
2

Where college types are based on the Barron’s ranking as described in Section 2.4.3.
See here: https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cpa.asp.
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Table 18: Cost function parameter estimates

Enrollment squared

(1)
costs1
1057.6∗∗∗
(120.4)

(2)
costs2
624.2∗∗∗
(14.85)
-0.0000919∗∗∗
(0.0000153)

P rivate college
0.000841∗∗∗
(0.000111)
182
0.296

Constant
N
adj. R2

0.000222∗∗∗
(0.0000126)
1445
0.604

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Estimates for the cost parameters in (A.1) for each college type. Note that all variables have been
scaled down by the total student population, and the costs have been further scaled down by $40,000
to fit the model units.

all non-instructional expenditure including academic support, student services, and institutional support. The other is by using the budget constraint in Equation (2.18), where
we calculate cost by adding up all tuition revenue, net grant revenue, government appropriations, unrestricted revenue from private sources, and subtracting off total instructional
expenditure. We rely on both methods by defining costs in the left hand side of equation
(A.1) as the maximum over both methods (this helps us deal with cases where the second
procedure produces small or negative numbers). The results of the estimation are provided
in Table 18.
Next, we follow Epple et al. (2006) in their aggregation procedure to transform our cost
function parameter estimates from (A.1) into our corresponding model parameters. If there
are ns colleges in type s, we assume they are identical in the model so that total enrollment
P s s
K s simply scales up the individual enrollments: K s = ni=1
ki = ns k s . We can then sum
up the individual cost functions:

C(K s ) =

ns
X

C(kis ) =

ns
X
 s

O0 + O2s (kis )2

i=1

i=1
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C(K s ) = ns O0s + ns O2s (k s )2
C(K s ) = os0 + os2 (K s )2
where os0 = ns O0s , and os2 = O2s /ns . We have 182 colleges in type 1, and 1,483 in type 2, so
we find that (o12 , o22 ) = (5.77, 0.44), and (o10 , o20 ) = (0.15, 0.25) based on our estimates of the
parameters from (A.1).
College subsidies. Similar to the cost function estimation above, we estimate T r1s for
each College type s using our IPEDS sample. We rely on variation in enrollment within
each college type, and measure subsidies to colleges by the level of state government appropriations and federal funding they receive. We simply estimate the slope in the following
regression relating government transfers to enrollment levels:
s

transf eris = Tˆr1 ki + εi .

The results of the estimation are given in Table 19 below.
Table 19: Government transfer function parameter estimates

Enrollment
N
adj. R2

(1)
transf er1
1.044∗∗∗
(0.0516)
182
0.691

(2)
transf er2
0.620∗∗∗
(0.0112)
1445
0.679

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Net tuition variation within college types
We use the BPS to show how net tuition, defined as sticker-price tuition minus collegespecific grants (need- and merit-based financial-aid) varies with student Expected Family
Contribution (EFC). Figure 21 below provides binned-scatter plots which show how nettuition levels off for students with high EFC who are less likely to receive financial-aid from
the colleges.
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Figure 21: Binned-scatter plots for net-tuition and EFC.
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Binned-scatter plots for net tuition (sticker-price tuition minus college-specific grants) for highlyselective colleges (left panel) and non-selective colleges (right panel). The data come from the 2012
cohort of the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study (BPS).

A.2.3. Simulated Method of Moments Procedure
First, let Mjdata denote the jth empirical moment out of J total moments. To estimate
our model, we first draw N = 15, 000 students (consistent with our HSLS sample) across
S = 100 simulations using our distribution over (y, ℓ). Let Θ denote the vector of parameters
decribed in Section 2.4.4, and let Mjs (Θ) denote the denote the jth model calculated moment
implied by Θ for simulation s = 1, . . . , S. We seek Θ̂ to minimize the following unweighted
criterion function:
J 
X
Mjdata −
j=1

1
S

PS

2
s
s=1 Mj (Θ)
.
Mjdata
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A.2.4. Proofs of Propositions
Derivation of (2.20)
Let λI , λL , λκ be the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint (2.18), average ability
identity constraint (2.16), and enrollment identitiy constraint (2.15) respectively. First
order conditions for Iµ , Lµ , κ, T (y, σ) are then

−λκ = λL L + λI [I + C ′ (κ) − T r′ (κ)]

[κ]
[Iµ ]

ξs QI = λI κ

[Lµ ]

ξs QL = λL κ

[T (y, σ)]

R
∂ q̃
λκ λL ℓ ∂T (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
T (y, σ) = −
−
(A.2)
R ∂ q̃
λI
λI
∂T (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
R
q̃ g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
λT (y, σ)
+
− R ∂ q̃
R ∂ q̃
λI ∂T (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
∂T (y,σ) g(σ|ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)

where λT (y, σ) is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint on tuition. Combining these
equations gives (2.20).

Derivation of (2.22)
Let q̃(σ s ) = q̃(y, ℓ, σ s , T s (y, σ s ), T −s (y, σ s )). The first order condition the admissions standard is
R

R
T (y, σ s )q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
λκ λL ℓ q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
R
R
≥−
−
,
λI
λI
q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
q̃(σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)

which holds with equality when σ s > 0. Combining with (A.2), we arrive at (2.22).
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(A.3)

Proposition 1
Proof. Combining (2.22) and (2.20), we find
QLµ
QIµ

Z
−

Z



∂ q̃ s (σ )

R

ℓ − R
R
R

ℓ ∂T s (y,σs ) g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
s

∂ q̃ s (σ s )
∂T s (y,σ s ) g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)

2
q̃ s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
∂ q̃ s (σ s )
∂T s (y,σ s ) g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)

R
dy +


 q̃ s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)

λT (y, σ s )q̃ s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)dµ(y, ℓ)
≥ 0. (A.4)
R ∂ q̃s (σ )
λI ∂T s (y,σs ) g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
s

Since the constraint on tuition is never binding, we have λT (y, σ) = 0. Rewrite the left
hand side of (A.4) to obtain
QLµ
QIµ

Z

Z


q (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ) ∗
s

R ∂qs (σs )

R s
ℓ ∂T s g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
ℓq (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
R
−
dy
R ∂qs (σs )
q s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
|ℓ)µ(y,
dℓ)
g(σ
s
s
∂T
|
{z
}
≥0

Z
+

R
R

|

2
q s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ; y)

dy ,
∂q s (σ )
− ∂T s (y,σs ) g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ; y)
s
{z
}

(A.5)

>0

where q s (σ s ) = q̃ s (y, ℓ, T (y, σ s )). We show that (A.5) is strictly positive for all σs > σ, so
that the college does not choose an interior admissions standard.
Clearly, the term on the bottom is strictly positive provided there is a positive mass of
students for which q s (σ s ) > 0 and

∂q s (σ s )
∂T s

< 0. To see that the bracketed term on the

top is positive (for each a), note that it is the difference in means of ℓ according to two
distributions, H0 and H1 , with associated densities: h0 (ℓ) =
R

∂q s (σ s )
g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y,ℓ)
∂T s
∂q s (σ s )
g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y,dℓ)
∂T s

s
R q (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y,ℓ)
q s (σ s )g(σ s |ℓ)µ(y,dℓ)

and h1 (ℓ) =

. The term being positive is then implied by the fact that H0 has first-

order stochastic dominance over H1 .
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To see that this is the case, define

F (ℓ̂) = H0 (ℓ̂) − H1 (ℓ̂)
Z ℓ̂
Z ℓ̂
h1 (ℓ)dℓ
h0 (ℓ)dℓ −
=
0

0

Note that F is continuously differentiable, and limℓ→0 F (ℓ) = 0, limℓ→∞ F (ℓ) = 0. The
interior solution to the first order condition F ′ (ℓ∗ ) = 0 uniquely minimizes F :
For College 1,
F ′ (ℓ) = h0 (ℓ) − h1 (ℓ)

R 1


q (σ 1 )g(σ 1 |ℓ)µ(a, dℓ) ∂q 1 (σ 1 )
1
= q (σ 1 ) − R ∂q1 (σ )
g(σ 1 |ℓ)µ(a, ℓ)
1
∂T 1
|ℓ)µ(a,
dℓ)
g(σ
1
1

∂TR 1


q (σ 1 )g(σ 1 |ℓ)µ(a, dℓ)
1
C1
∗
=
− R ∂q1 (σ )
λC VT (y, ℓ , T (a, σ 1 )) ∗
1
1 − q 1 (σ 1 )
g(σ 1 |ℓ)µ(y, dℓ)
∂T 1
|
{z
}
G(ℓ)

q 1 (σ 1 )g(σ 1 |ℓ)µ(y, ℓ)[1 − q 1 (σ 1 )]

We have a unique interior minimum since,
1. limℓ→0 G(ℓ) < 0
2. limℓ→∞ G(ℓ) = ∞
3. G′ (ℓ) > 0
Thus we have F (ℓ) < 0 for ℓ ∈ (0, ∞).
Since (A.5) is strictly positive, the lower bound constraint on σ s binds, so the college does
not use the admissions threshold to screen students.
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A.2.5. Lifecycle Model
In this section, we describe how a simple lifecycle model used for the calibration maps easily
into the two period model introduced in Section 2.3. Consider an individual who lives for
T + 1 periods, where a period is four years and the first years are spent in college:

max

{cj ,aj+1 }j=0,...,T

s.t.

u(c0 ) +

T
X

β j u(cj )

(A.6)

j=1

c0 + a1 + T = a0
cj + aj+1 = aj R + w(1 − τ )γs ℓα , j = 1, . . . , T
a1 ≥ as

(A.7)

CRRA preferences imply that from the Euler equation we can write u(c1+t ) = (βR)

t(1−σ)
σ

u(c1 ),

which means that
β̃u(c1 ) =

T
X

β j u(cj ).

j=1

We also combine the budget constraints for j = 1, . . . , T , and plug in the result from the
Euler equation to get

c1

T
X
(βR)
j=1

j−1
σc

Rj−1

= a1 R + w(1 − τ )γs ℓ

α

T
X
j=1

1
Rj−1

.

Putting everything together, we have the same two period model from Section 2.3:

max
c0 ,c1

s.t.

u(c0 ) + β̃u(c1 )

(A.8)

c0 + a1 + T = a0
c1 = a1 R̃ + w̃(1 − τ )γs ℓα
a1 ≥ as
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(A.9)

where
β̃ =

T
X

β j (βR)

(j−1)(1−σc )
σc

j=1

R

R̃ =

j−1

(βR) σc
j=1 Rj−1

PT

w̃ =

w

PT

1
j=1 Rj−1
j−1

(βR) σc
j=1 Rj−1

PT
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A.2.6. Additional Model Results
Table 20: Effect on colleges of equalizing application Patterns

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
% Enrolled

College 1
Baseline More Apps
1.86
1.82
2.1
2.04
2.01
1.96
7.15
6.8

College 2
Baseline More Apps
1.28
1.3
0.98
0.97
1.79
1.81
32.09
31.09

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.09
0.11
0.25
0.55

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.22
0.21
0.31
0.26

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84

0.0
0.01
0.25
0.74

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17

0.02
0.39
0.38
0.21

Effect on college market of fixing application choices for all students to be the same as the application
choices of high-income students in the baseline estimation.

A.2.7. Effect of Less Informative Signals
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Table 21: Effect on colleges of making signals less informative

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
% Enrolled

College 1
Baseline 6 ∗ σg2
1.86
1.67
2.1
2.4
2.01
1.87
7.15
8.93

College 2
Baseline 6 ∗ σg2
1.28
1.19
0.98
1.14
1.79
1.71
32.09
39.72

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.10
0.12
0.27
0.51

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.25
0.20
0.29
0.26

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84

0.0
0.09
0.30
0.61

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17

0.14
0.43
0.29
0.14

Table 22: Effect on colleges of making signals less informative when signal strength is
correlated with income

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
% Enrolled

College 1
Baseline Incr. σ var
1.86
1.77
2.1
2.24
2.01
1.94
7.15
7.93

College 2
Baseline Incr. σ var
1.28
1.24
0.98
1.03
1.79
1.75
32.09
34.48

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.10
0.12
0.27
0.51

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.24
0.20
0.30
0.26

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84

0.0
0.04
0.23
0.73

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17

0.06
0.43
0.34
0.16

This table shows the effect on colleges of making signals less informative, but making the
loss of information larger for high-income students.
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Figure 22: Welfare changes as a function of increases to the signal variance.
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Figure 23: Student enrollment rates with less informative signals

0-30% Ability
College 1, Baseline
College 1, Incr signal variance
College 2, Baseline
College 2, Incr signal variance

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

0

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

0

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

Top 10% Ability

1.0
Enrollment Rate

Enrollment Rate

0.8

0.8

0.0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

60-90% Ability

1.0

30-60% Ability

1.0
Enrollment Rate

Enrollment Rate

1.0

0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

This figure compares average student enrollment rates by ability group and parental transfers both in the baseline equilibrium and in the equilibrium with less informative signals.
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Figure 24: Welfare effect of less informative signals when signals are correlated with income
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Percent of lifetime consumption students of different parental-income and ability groups are willing
to give up in order to switch to the equilibrium with less informative signals. In this experiment,
the loss of information is larger for high-income students.
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A.2.8. Effect of Perfectly Informative Signals
Table 23: Effect on colleges of making signals perfectly informative

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
% Enrolled

College 1
Baseline Perfect Info
1.86
1.91
2.1
1.87
2.01
2.02
7.15
6.5

College 2
Baseline Perfect Info
1.28
1.36
0.98
0.93
1.79
1.86
32.09
29.8

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.08
0.10
0.22
0.60

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.20
0.21
0.33
0.26

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84

0.0
0.0
0.08
0.92

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17

0.0
0.27
0.53
0.20

A.2.9. Policy Experiments: Increasing Pell Grants
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Table 24: Effect on colleges of increasing the Pell Grant maximum

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
κ
τ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
% Enrolled
Tax rate (%)

College 1
Baseline Pell Grant
1.86
1.87
2.1
2.67
2.01
2.09
7.15
7.25
1.51
3.93

College 2
Baseline Pell Grant
1.28
1.26
0.98
1.04
1.79
1.77
32.09
32.14
1.51
3.93

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.14
0.16
0.31
0.38

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.23
0.22
0.31
0.24

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84

0.0
0.0
0.14
0.86

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17

0.06
0.38
0.39
0.17

Table 25: Effect of changes to Pell Grant maximum with adjusted tuition caps on selective
colleges (College 1)

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
σ
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
Admissions Threshold
% Enrolled

Baseline
1.86
2.10
2.01
1.52
7.15

College 1
Pell Grant 10% Adjust
1.87
1.88
2.67
2.81
2.09
2.11
1.76
1.71
7.25
6.84

30% Adjust
1.91
2.84
2.14
1.58
6.02

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.10
0.12
0.26
0.52

0.14
0.16
0.31
0.38

0.14
0.16
0.30
0.40

0.11
0.14
0.29
0.46

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability
Overall welfare change

0.0
0.0
0.15
0.84
–

0.0
0.0
0.14
0.86
1.97%

0.0
0.0
0.13
0.87
2.03%

0.0
0.0
0.09
0.91
2.17%

Effect of changes to Pell Grant maximum when tuition caps adjust. We compare the baseline scenario
to scenarios where the Pell Grant maximum increases to 2.5, and the tuition caps increase by 10%
and 30%.
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Table 26: Effect of changes to Pell Grant maximum with adjusted tuition caps on nonselective colleges (College 2)

Lµ
Iµ
Γs
σ
κ

Avg Student Ability
Instr Spending per Student
Value-added
Admissions Threshold
% Enrolled

Baseline
1.28
0.98
1.79
1.02
32.09

College 2
Pell Grant 10% Adjust
1.26
1.27
1.04
1.13
1.77
1.82
1.17
1.20
32.14
30.9

30% Adjust
1.31
1.30
1.90
1.25
28.53

Income Distribution
Q1 Income
Q2 Income
Q3 Income
Q4 Income

0.22
0.20
0.31
0.27

0.23
0.22
0.31
0.24

0.23
0.21
0.31
0.25

0.22
0.21
0.32
0.25

Ability Distribution
0-30% Ability
30-60% Ability
60-90% Ability
Top 10% Ability
Overall welfare change

0.01
0.41
0.40
0.17
–

0.06
0.38
0.39
0.17
1.97%

0.05
0.37
0.40
0.18
2.03%

0.03
0.35
0.41
0.21
2.17%

Effect of changes to Pell Grant maximum when tuition caps adjust. We compare the baseline scenario
to scenarios where the Pell Grant maximum increases to 2.5, and the tuition caps increase by 10%
and 30%.
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Figure 25: Effect on students of increasing the Pell Grant maximum

0-30% Ability
College 1, Baseline
College 1, Pell Grant
College 2, Baseline
College 2, Pell Grant

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

0

60-90% Ability

Enrollment Rate

Enrollment Rate

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

Top 10% Ability

1.0

0.8

0.0

0.8

0.0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

1.0

30-60% Ability

1.0
Enrollment Rate

Enrollment Rate

1.0

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

0

2
4
6
Parental Transfers, $10k/yr

Student sorting by parental transfers and ability group both in the baseline equilibrium, and in an
equilibrium where the Pell Grants maximum has increased from 5.65k per year to 25k per year.

Figure 26: Welfare effects of Pell Grant changes in baseline and full-information calibration

Equivalent % Change in Per-Period Consumption
Baseline Calibration
Perfect Info Calibration

0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
2

3
4
Pell Grant Maximum ($10k)

5

Average increases in welfare due to increases in the Pell Grant maximum both under the baseline
parameter estimates, and under a perfect-information calibration. Failing to account for admissions
uncertainty would cause the model to overstate the welfare gains from the policy.
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A.2.10. Computational Appendix
This section briefly describes the general procedure for how the equilibrium of the model is
solved numerically. We start with a guess for College policies {κs , Is , Ls , Γs , Ts (a, σ), σs =
0}s∈{1,2} student application probabilities {pi (a, ℓ)}i∈{AB,A1,A2} , and tax rate τ . We then
update all choices so that they are consistent with optimal agent behavior, and iterate until
our guess is consistent with itself. Our procedure is detailed in the following steps:
1. Using guesses {pi (a, ℓ)}i∈{AB,A1,A2} , τ , Γs , solve for the total enrollment probability
functions at each College, q̃ s (a, ℓ, T 1 , T 2 ), s ∈ {1, 2}. We find these functions using
(2.14) and (2.8).
2. Given guess {κs , Is , Ls , Ts (a, σ)}, q̃ s (a, ℓ, T 1 , T 2 ), for s ∈ {1, 2}, update the tuition
and admissions standards for each college (we iterate until we find a fixed-point in the
college policies).
(a) For each College s, use guess for own aggregates {κs , Is , Ls }, and guess for other
Colleges tuition policy, T−s (a, σ) to find updated tuition policy T̂s (a, σ) using
(2.20). To handle the tuition cap, set T̂s (a, σ) = T̄s if T̂s (a, σ) > T̄s .
(b) For each College s, use updated tuition policy T̂s (a, σ) to solve for the updated
admissions standard σ̂ s in (2.22)
(c) Check for convergence
• If sup |Ts (a, σ) − T̂s (a, σ)| > 10−5 , set Ts (a, σ) = T̂s (a, σ) and repeat (a)
• Otherwise, continue
3. Using updated tuition and admissions, find updated College aggregates {κ̂s , Iˆs , L̂s , Γ̂s }
using (2.15), (2.16), (2.18), (2.13)
4. Using updated guesses, find updated tax rate τ̂ using (2.23)
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5. Using all updated values and functions, find updated application decisions
{p̂i (a, ℓ)}i∈{AB,A1,A2} as in (2.25)
6. Check for convergence.




Let X̂ ≡ {κ̂s , Iˆs , L̂s , Γ̂s }s∈{1,2} , τ̂ , and X ≡ {κs , Is , Ls , Γs }s∈{1,2} , τ
• If sup |X−X̂| > 10−5 , set X = X̂, {pi (a, ℓ)}i∈{AB,A1,A2} = {p̂i (a, ℓ)}i∈{AB,A1,A2} ,
and repeat (1)
• Otherwise, exit
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